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Electricity distribution networks are susceptible to random faults. On occurrence of a fault 
the upstream breaker on the faulty section trips. This leads to supply interruption to all 
customers connected to that affected section. Depending on the network configuration, 
opening and closing of breakers to try and restore supply to unaffected sections does take 
some time. This dissertation evaluates the application of selected smart technologies with the 
aim of improving the reliability of Eskom’s medium voltage (MV) networks. The intent is to 
reduce the outage duration, frequency of outages, maintenance costs, and operational 
expenditure while improving overall system performance. The reliability of a distribution 
system depends on a number of factors including the location (urban or rural), environment, 
the type of system and the type equipment installed. Factors that affect the customer supply 
availability include the failure rate of equipment and the duration of an outage. The outcome 
of the application of smart technology on the MV network will influence the availability of 
customer supply as the technology could not only be used to reduce the failure rate of the 
system but also decrease the time spent on  fault finding and maintenance  due to greater 
visibility system wide. Historical and predictive approaches are the two power system 
reliability assessments that are predominantly used. Both approaches are applied whereby 
expected performance is modelled, given the specific network topology, past performance, 
customer numbers, operating environment, etc. A number of network components including 
transformers, lines, isolators, and fuses are used and applied in a systematic manner to 
calculate the expected downtime experienced by the customer supplied on different 
connections of the network with different smart technology interventions. To achieve this, a 
methodology is developed and verified by comparing the calculated results with DigSilent 
PowerFactory simulations using a few selected samples of the existing networks from the 
KwaZulu Natal Operating Unit (KZN OU). The application of smart technology has 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The distribution system is a fundamental part of the entire electrical power system, as it is 
the last link between the generators and the customer. In many cases, these links are radial in 
nature and thus susceptible to power outages due to a single event (no redundancy in the 
distribution system). It has been stated that most of interruptions that occur in the power 
systems are due to failures in the distribution system[1-2]. The distribution network is not 
only geographically large but has a complex and interconnected nature. It is exposed to a 
number of faults including theft, weather, structure failure, vegetation and animals.  
In general, many distribution systems have normally open points in a meshed configuration, 
so that the system is operated as a radial feed. However during fault conditions normal open 
switches can be closed so that the supply can be restored to unaffected areas.  The idea is to 
isolate the faulted part and reconnect the healthy part of the system as soon as possible to 
enhance overall system reliability. The reliability of a distribution system depends on a 
number of factors including the location (urban or rural), environment, the type of system 
and the type of equipment installed. Events that affect the customer supply availability 
include the failure rate of equipment and the duration of an outage.  A number of traditional 
systems including devices such as over-current relays, reclosers, fuses and sectionalisers are 
commonly used to protect the distribution system[3-5]. Eskom Distribution also uses these 
protective devices to minimise the customer impact per load point.  
The Smart Distribution Grid has gradually become an obvious choice to face future 
challenges in the power system because it provides integration and greater visibility over 
traditional approaches. It delivers a system that can remotely monitor the condition of the 
equipment, diagnose the faulted section while employing measures that will keep the system 
operating optimally [6-9].  
1.2  Problem Statement 
Adequate energy is essential to South Africa’s economic growth and development, and to the 
needs of the society. Power distribution systems are geographically large in nature and they 
include a large number of components thus making them extremely susceptible to system 
configuration and environmental difficulties. This means that the system has a number of 
interconnections that do not necessary follow easily accessible routes, but are naturally 
guided by laws[1]. Eskom Distribution is constantly under enormous pressure to improve 
network performance, and is continuously investigating methods of monitoring this using the 
recognised key performance indicators[10]. This research evaluates the application of smart 
technologies with the aim of improving the reliability of Eskom’s medium voltage (MV) 
networks. The scope of this study only covers MV feeders connecting the distribution 
substations to the customers. Customers, substation equipment and sub-transmission 
networks are excluded. It is limited to calculating the customer based reliability indices and 
does not include the calculation of load based or economic indices.  
 It will also answer these key questions: 
a) What Smart devices are there in the market? 




c) What smart technologies are valid for which kind of network? 
1.3  The aims are 
a) Reduction of unplanned outage duration,  
b) Reducing the frequency of unplanned outages,  
c) Reduction of maintenance and operational expenditure associated with outage 
management while improving overall system performance 
1.4 Hypothesis 
Smart technology applied in a correct manner can enhance system performance and improve 
reliability of the power distribution system by making use of digital and advanced 
technologies.  
1.5 Dissertation organization 
The organization of this report is as follows:  
a) Chapter 2 presents the literature review conducted which covers past work done by 
different authors and their contribution to this study as well as introducing the smart 
grid technologies evaluated for the improvement of reliability in the distribution 
system.  
b) Chapter 3 introduces the reliability concept, indices, evaluation approaches, as well 
as the mathematical approach for reliability indices. It touches on the key 
components that cover overall outage duration on MV network and how they affect 
the reliability indices.  
c) Chapter 4 shows the fault analysis for the KZN OU  
d) Chapter 5 covers application of reliability evaluation on the sample network 
developed.  
e) The application of the reliability evaluation methodology on one of the existing 
networks in the KZN OU is discussed in Chapter 6.  
f) Finally,   Chapter 7 provides concluding remarks and recommendations for future 













CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Power Distribution System 
The electrical power system serves to generate, transport and distribute electrical energy to 
consumers in an efficient, economic and reliable manner, and consists of generating stations, 
transmission lines and distribution networks[11-12]. At the distribution networks, electric 
power at medium voltage is supplied to industrial, commercial and domestic loads as shown 
in Figure 2-1. Medium voltage ranges from 1 kV to 33 kV[13]. The focus of this study is on 
the MV feeders connecting the distribution substations to the customers. Customers, 
substation equipment and sub-transmission networks are excluded 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Power Distribution System [14] 
The MV network is made up of a number of components including fuses, conductors, 
distribution transformers, reclosers, switches, etc. The length of feeders is related to the load 
density and location. For example the rural network has a small customer density but the 
feeder length may be long as shown in Figure 2-2[13]. This is a typical 22 kV network which 
has 200 km of line to feed 400 customers. This type of network has a large amount of 
equipment, low revenue and the expected performance will be poor based on the increased 
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Figure 2-2: Rural MV network [14] 
The urban network has an overhead or underground cable that covers a short geographical 
area as shown in Figure 2-3[13]. The same network feeds 400 customers but has 20 km of 
line. The performance of this urban line is better as compared to the rural network due to 
high customer density, short travel and fault finding time. For a cable network the 
performance is even better because it is not exposed to faults due to bad weather, due to 
vegetation and due to live wire contact; however more customers are affected by the outages 
and outage duration is longer due to different types of fault finding technique associated with 
this network as components are not all visible[15-16].  
These examples illustrate that network topology and configuration have an impact on the 
network performance and this must be accounted for when considering the use of smart 
technology.  
SCADA is a system that Eskom Distribution is currently using to control its distribution 
network. SCADA is a central monitoring and control system that involves a system operator 
in decision making, through the available data, who then controls the distribution network. 
Even though some features are automated like reclosers and section breakers, there is no full 
Distribution Automation (DA). For example, if there is a fault on the system, the protection 
will operate to isolate the fault from the rest of the network. Thereafter the maintenance crew 
will be dispatched to travel to site to manually investigate the faulted section. With smart 





Figure 2-3: Urban MV network [14] 
A literature review has been conducted into the application of smart technology with the aim 
of improving the reliability of power distribution system by reducing the duration and the 
frequency of outages and improving overall system performance. The first part deals with 
reviewing the past work done by different authors concerning reliability improvement of 
distribution system. The second part is aimed at finding the smart grid technologies that can 
be applied on the distribution system with the purpose of enhancing overall system 
reliability. 
2.2 MV reliability studies that have been conducted in the past  
The reliability analysis of the power distribution system has received significant attention 
over the years, because it forms a final link to the customer so that any fault taking place in 
this link directly affect consumers and has a negative effect on the utility revenue. The 
reliability indices of a power distribution system for the conventional system, the automated 
system and smart grid configurations can be calculated and the results can be compared. A 
number of traditional reliability studies on distribution networks have been conducted in the 
past, where the reliability improvement obtained is due to different interventions such as tree 
trimming, changes in design and operating policies [19-20]. In [21] two mitigation 
techniques to maximize reliability were classified as electric and non-electric.  Electric 
measures involve direct impact on the distribution system, examples include addition of 
protective devices such as reclosers, fuses and switching devices and system reconfiguration. 
While non-electric measures do not have direct impact on the distribution system, examples 
include vegetation management and bird guards.  
 In [22-23] the reliability evaluation of smart grids, benefits,  the growth core, forecasts and 
trends are described. Also the models for reliability evaluation are presented. Cost estimates 
and benefits of the Smart Grid applied to the distribution system were analysed. Today’s 
investment on Smart Grids is significantly higher compared to 7 years ago; however, based 
on the outcome of this study, the fundamental assumptions and evaluation indicate that the 
benefits of the anticipated Distribution Automation (DA) significantly outweigh the costs as 
further illustrated in[24-27]. Artificial Neural Network techniques were used to evaluate the 
reliability of distribution systems [28-31].  
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A comparative analysis of distribution system reliability enhancement was done through 
application of different devices such as manual and automated switching devices. Also the 
reduction of  maintenance and operational costs is determined [32-34]. However significant 
improvement can be realised by taking a holistic approach, where an overall system is fully 
integrated through the use of smart technology and communication network abilities. In[35], 
distribution automation systems and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) that are broadly 
used in smart distribution systems are applied by Xcel Energy to meet their reliability goals 
by maximizing the already present but often overlooked smart grid capabilities of the 
delivery and distribution network including smart in-home devices and electric vehicles. 
In an attempt to improve Eskom Distribution’s network, a number of refurbishment and 
capital projects have been initiated and executed[36]. As a means of reducing the customer 
impact, the KZN OU has conducted a study to install fuses on transformers only, by 
application of the expulsion type fuse on medium voltage overhead lines. The intention is 
that when a transformer fails, ideally the fuse should operate, isolating the faulty transformer 
from the rest of the network. This yields benefits with regards to overall system performance  
in that fewer customers are affected due to the fuse operation rather than an upstream breaker 
or recloser operating[37].  
A study was also conducted in [38] on a method aimed at clearing single phase-to-earth 
faults without causing a three phase supply interruption to customers. This work only 
focused on improving reliability of momentary interruptions. 
In [10, 39-40] the high-level benefits of smart grid technologies for Eskom’s medium 
voltage network were evaluated. The application of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), auto 
reclosers and Fault Path Indicators (FPIs) was simulated on a sample MV network.  The 
above studies have produced better results compared to traditional approaches.  
Nowadays utilities in general are investing in the applications of smart grid technology on 
power systems. The results proved a huge improvement of the automated system compared 
to the conventional system[41-43].  The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has started an 
initiative to deploy smart grid technologies nationally since 2010 and the results have shown 
huge improvement on overall system performance. These technologies include the 
installation of sensors, upgrading of communications systems, and control technologies that, 
when integrated with field devices (automated switches, line sensors, etc.), provide highly 
responsive and effective grid operations[44].  
The following shortfalls have been identified with regards to the above mentioned reliability 
approaches: 
a) Some of the reliability improvement approaches have been limited to one possible 
solution, meaning the impact of the number of solutions on affected customers has 
not been looked at.  
b) It is a very good practice to ensure maintenance standards are upheld at all time as 
per the utility’s specification. The challenge with the above mentioned studies is that 
there is no real-time monitoring of the equipment. The control center has to wait for 
the customers to call and report the fault. 
c) The majority of the previous work takes into account the application of auto 
reclosers or sectionalisers to speed up the fault isolation and service restoration. The 
reliability enhancement for these devices has also been analysed. However the 
integrated effect of different technologies has not been considered. 
d) The majority of this work is conducted and applied in utilities abroad. This means 
the evaluation of some of these technologies needs to be conducted with the purpose 
of finding suitable technologies for the Eskom Distribution network. 
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e) In addition, during power outages the new technologies provide automatic circuit re-
configuration and reroute the power to minimize the impact on the affected 
customers. 
The implementation of smart grid technology differs from utility to utility. This depends on 
many factors including infrastructure, location, policies, etc. The Eskom Distribution 
network topology, customer numbers and distribution on the network, operating environment 
and other network topology related variables are very different from that of utilities abroad, 
and hence other smart devices that work well in other countries may not be compatible for 
the Eskom Distribution network. Also the network protection and configuration has a huge 
impact on the reliability 
This research is aimed at overcoming the above mentioned shortcoming by the investigation 
of new smart distribution technology capabilities and their application on the Eskom 
distribution system.  The modelling of additional smart grid technologies including remotely 
controlled or automated tie point switches, line monitors, transformer remote monitoring, 
and integration of Distribution Management Systems (DMSs) and SCADA systems was also 
included. The integration of these technologies enhances the overall system performance 
through automation of power restoration, reducing both the impact and duration of 
interruptions. 
Smart technology provides greater visibility of disturbances over traditional approaches. 
Traditional approaches mostly rely on customer calls to report the outage and the operation 
of switches to isolate the faulted part and restore supply to the healthy part of the system is 
done manually [45]. Visibility is an engineering solution that allows network control 
operators to have immediate knowledge of network operations taking place for all breakers 
on the distribution network. This means that when a breaker trips, network control is 
immediately aware of the loss of supply as opposed to only being made aware when a 
customer calls in to the contact centre [36]. Visibility of breakers creates opportunity for 
improved fault management and reduced restoration times. 
2.3  Smart Grid Technologies 
In a nutshell, the term “Smart Grid” refers to a conventional power system that uses digital 
technologies via two way communications to improve reliability, security and efficiency of 
power systems from generation through transmission and distribution system to the 
consumers [46]. The seven areas in the Smart Grid Conceptual Model contain customers, 
markets, service providers, operations, bulk generation, transmission and distribution as 




Figure 2-4: Smart Grid domain in conceptual model [47] 
 
The smart grid technologies can be characterised in the following five key areas [48-50]: 
a) Sensing and Measurement – this aspect requires technologies that will acquire and 
transform data into information to enhance decision making, through evaluation of 
plant health and integrity of the whole system. 
b) Integrated Communications – the modern grid cannot exist without fully 
integrated communication systems that will include digital communication 
technologies for real time information and power exchange.  
c) Advanced Control Methods – this ensures appropriate response for mitigation 
measures to any event through equipment monitoring, enabling rapid diagnosis and 
timely return service to customers. 
d) Advanced Components – these components play an important role in determining 
system behaviour. They result in improved real-time diagnostics, producing 
improved quality and reliability of supply, improved power densities and electrical 
effectiveness which creates major environmental developments. 
e) Improved Interfaces and Decision Support– decision making has been shortened 
to seconds. An algorithm associated with this application requires extensive, 
continuous, real-time use of tools that enable grid operators and managers with quick 
decision making.  At all level of the grid, it strengthens human decision making 
through the decision support system with improved interfaces. 
Traditional distribution system communications interfaces within this domain were 
unidirectional. Two way communication capabilities and distribution automation now exist 
through the application of smart technologies the advancement of distributed storage, 
distributed generation, demand response, system integration, load control and monitoring as 





Figure 2-5: Distribution domain model [47] 
2.4 Smart Grid benefits 
Smart Grid benefits are classified as follows [24]: 
a) Quality and reliability of power supply:  The Smart Grid is expected to improve 
the quality and reliability of power supply through reduced frequency and duration 
of outages. 
b) Benefits of cyber and safety security:  Through constant monitoring the system 
will detects hazardous situations that could threaten the reliability and security of 
supply.  
c) Energy efficiency: Ability to encourage consumers to reduce electricity usage 
during peak demands and system constraints which will eventually reduce energy 
losses and improve overall system performance.  
d) Conservation and environmental benefits: The Smart Grid supports renewable 
energy and enables an improved environment through reduction of pollutants and 
greenhouse gases (GHG). 
e) Financial benefits: Operational and maintenance cost savings are realized through 
the use of the smart grid. The utility has more control over its assets and optimal use 
of resources. Stake holder benefits are also realised. 
2.5 Smart Grid challenges 
There are a number of procedural and technical challenges experienced as the migration 
from traditional and conventional systems to smart grids is taking place therefore 
collaboration from all stakeholders is desired. These challenges are discussed below [26]. 
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2.5.1 Procedural challenges 
As the migration to a smart grid is taking place all these challenges need to be addressed for 
a successful migration. 
a) The need to understand and address all stakeholder requirements 
b) Complexity of the smart grid and understanding the fact that some aspects need 
human interaction and intervention while others need intelligent and automated 
controls. 
c) Migration is a lengthy process therefore gradual deployment is encouraged 
d) On-going risk assessment and training is encouraged to ensure cyber security of 
systems 
e) Consent based standard is encouraged 
f) Research and Development to ensure continuous improvement 
2.5.2 Technical Challenges 
Full integration across different areas of the system may pose technical challenges such as 
[24]: 
a) Robustness to handle smart equipment for future applications without any 
replacements. 
b) Communication system technologies and its various maturity stages 
c) Handling of data management 
d) Special care must be taken to ensure information and data privacy 
e) Special care is vital in software applications for every function and node of the 
Smart Grid. 
The application of specific smart grid technologies is used for achieving various functions in 
the electric power systems. For every application, there are a number of smart grid 
technologies available that can be categorized in the above described manner to achieve a 
specific goal. 
Table 2-1 presents a list of smart technologies that are currently available in the market to 












Table 2-1: List of Smart Devices 
2.6 Smart Fuse Saver 
This device is installed in series with a fuse and clears a fault in as little as a half-cycle 
before the fuse operates for a transient fault as the fuse is unable to distinguish between 
transient and permanent faults. The fuse blows on all faults. The smart fuse saver can also be 
easily integrated with the RTU to provide network visibility and events history of the spur 
line [54]. 
Device Impact on the 
number of 
interruptions 
Impact on duration of 
interruptions 
Impact on number of 
customer interrupted 
Smart fuse saver Will reduce number of 
faults by improving 
fuse failure rates, as a 
fuse tends to operate 
for temporary 
interruptions 
Will reduce the outage duration 
where fuse has blown due to 
transient fault. Will also provide 
visibility to SCADA for all fuse 
operations without intervention 
from the customer. 
Number of customers 
affected by interruptions 
will not change 
Transformer remote 
monitoring 
No impact on number 
of interruptions 
 
Will reduce the duration by a 
significant amount because it 
will provide visibility for all 
transformer interruptions 
without customer interventions. 
Number of customers 
affected by interruptions 
will not change 
Smart fault path 
indicator 
No impact on number 
of interruptions 
 
Will reduce the duration of 
interruption by a significant 
amount 
Will reduce the impact of 
number of customer 
affected, by quick 
identifying the faulted 
section. This will reduce 
the sectionalizing and 
fault finding time. 
Automatic feeder 
switches 
Will reduce the 




Will reduce the duration of the 
interruption 
Will reduce the impact of 
number of customers 
affected by interruption 
through self-healing 
Fault Location 
Isolation & Service 
restoration (FLISR) 
Will reduce the 
number of  faults 
through self-healing 
and alternative source 
transfer 
 
Will reduce the duration of 
interruption with a significant 
amount 
Will reduce the impact of 
number of customers 
affected by interruption 
through self-healing 
AMI & Smart meter 
for outage detection 
No impact on number 
of interruptions 
Will reduce the duration with a 
significant amount, by providing 
visibility all the way to the 
consumer. 
No impact on number of 





Figure 2-6: Fuse saver operation on a spur line [54] 
As noted in Figure 2-6 above, for a transient fault only the spur line customers would 
experience momentary interruption. When a permanent fault is experienced, after closing, 
the fault current will flow again and the fuse will now operate to clear the fault. Again, only 
the customers on the faulted spur line will experience an outage. 
 
Figure 2-7: Fuse saving methodology [54] 
KZN OU is currently fusing the transformers only, by application of expulsion type fuses on 
medium voltage overhead line networks. The intention is that when a transformer fails, 
ideally the fuse should operate isolating the faulty transformer from the rest of the network. 
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Therefore operation of a fuse means the protection has operated correctly. The installation of 
a smart fuse saver in series with the fuse in this instance was evaluated. The benefits for this 
device are achievable when the fuse is applied as a spur line protective device.  
Other utilities practise a “fuse saving” methodology by purposely mis-coordinating the fuse 
characteristic with the network breaker characteristic so that the breaker operates faster than 
the lateral fuse to clear a fault downstream of the lateral fuse as indicated in Figure 2-7.  
Others practice “fuse blowing” methodology by properly coordinating the lateral fuse with 
the network breaker, so that the fuse will clear any downstream fault within its rating and not 
the breaker as indicated in Figure 2-8.  Eskom is fusing the transformers only with the aim of 
isolating the faulty transformer, both fuse blowing and fuse saving practices are not 
employed by Eskom, therefore this technology is not a recommended solution for the KZN 
OU because it is not suitable for their network protection philosophy.  
 
Figure 2-8: Fuse blowing methodology [54] 
This device eliminates the permanent outages which are caused by fuse operating for a 
transient fault. It is for this reason that a huge improvement on SAIFI will be realised for 
utilities using “fuse blowing” methodology . 
2.7 Transformer Remote Monitoring 
During power outages or interruptions when the network breaker trips, the majority of the 
outage duration is spent patrolling the lines to try to locate the fault. The patrolman will first 
start by sectionalizing to find out exactly which section has faulted, and further 
sectionalizing on the section to identify which spur line has the problem. Once the faulted 
section is isolated, more time is spent on fault finding. Transformer remote monitoring will 
reduce sectionalising and fault finding time during transformer faults by providing 
transformer visibility as indicated by figure 2-9. This will yield improvement on both the 
duration and the frequency of the interruptions of impacted customers. 
The transformer’s remote monitoring dry contact outputs will be monitored to detect a 
change of state, which would indicate a trip. This data will be transmitted via communication 
network to a central control room, where a final visual output and identification of which 




Figure 2-9: Transformer remote monitoring overview diagram [55] 
2.8 Fault Path Indicators (FPI)  
Power utilities measure reliability by monitoring interruption frequency and duration, 
through reliability indices.  FPI are a smart solution that will improve reliability by reducing 
overall interruption duration.  After a fault occurs and the protection clears the fault, the FPI 
communicates the location of the fault to the SCADA. There is either a cable fault indicator 
or an overhead line fault indicator. For overhead lines there is a portable handheld, pole 
mounted or conductor mounted electronic sensor, specifically designed for the detection of 
phase- and earth faults on overhead distribution lines [56-58]  
 
Figure 2-10: Conductor mounted FPI [59] 
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This device as shown by Figure 2-10 operates by monitoring the current at a specific location 
on the feeder. To identify a fault, it monitors the feeder for a loss of voltage following a 
rapid rate of rise of current (di/dt) over a 30ms period, or an overcurrent condition.This 
reduces the impact of the number of customer affected, by quick identifying the faulted 
section.  
2.8.1 Benefits for using the smart FPI 
a) Most beneficial method of reducing the overall outage duration. Most cost effective 
approach for reducing the fault finding time by at least 50% or more. 
b) Return on Investment (ROI) is realised within a year or two 
c) It allows rapid restoration of power to the unaffected section of the line  
d) Reduces the wear and tear of the equipment that is caused by the sectionalising time 
and also allows optimal utilisation of resources. 
e)  Ideal for cable networks - it eliminate the need to open cable enclosures during fault 
finding time , overall outage duration usually longer than for overhead lines 
f) If there is an interruption the meter stops running. By applying the FPI the 
interruption time is reduced which leads to increased revenue.  
g) Proactive maintenance approach, the use of time reset on FPI to get to the root of 
temporary interruptions before they become permanent faults in the indicators and 
fault counters in areas affected. 
2.9 Automatic Feeder Switches 
Migration to a smart distribution system needs to be done gradually; due to the cost 
associated with it and it gives the organization enough time to learn the new technology.  
Therefore SCADA communications can also be extended to many existing reclosers and 
sectionalizers by interfacing communications technology such as wirelesses to the switch 
controller [33].  
Similar to the network breaker monitoring function at the substation level, adding the 
communications infrastructure outside the substation allows network visibility to the control 
centre operators. Automatic feeder switches as indicated by Figure 2-11 are equipped with a 
tool that can automatically close the breaker after it has been opened due to a fault. It serves 
to detect and interrupt both load and fault current. They are able to clear momentary faults 
without interference from the operator. They improve service continuity by automatically 
restoring power to the line after a momentary fault. If there is a permanent fault in a system 
then protection equipment is designed to minimize the impact by interrupting the supply to a 
faulty part of the network. The supply will remain off until the operator arrives to site for 
fault finding, repairing the faulty equipment and returning the service back to normal. These 
devices can operate independently in response to local events or in response to signals from a 
central control system [60].  
Applying these devices together with the FPI can assist in quick fault identification. 
Significant improvement is realised on the duration of an interruption as well as the number 
of customers affected. In addition, on complex or interconnected networks intelligent 
controllers and more advanced automated feeder switches with greater scope can be 
employed. Additional benefits are realised on networks with a normal tie point where power 
flow can be bi-directional. The switch immediately upstream of the faulted section will trip; 
the downstream switch will change the protection settings in anticipation of changing the 
power to flow the opposite direction. The normally open tie switch will then close 





Figure 2-11: Automated Feeder Switch [60] 
Fault Location Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR)  technologies include automated 
feeder switches and reclosers, line monitors, communication networks, distribution 
management systems (DMSs), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
outage management systems (OMSs), and data processing tools. 
These are more sophisticated automatic control strategies that act with a larger scope of 
responsibility and are ideal for more complex or interconnected feeder arrangements. As part 
of smart devices deployment, the intelligent controller needs to be added at the regional or 
local level. 
This capability will allow automated feeder switches to react to a fault by opening switches 
based on local data, then isolate the fault and restore service based on intelligence provided 
by nearby switches on the same feeder loop. The intelligent controller would depend on 
communications to adequately manage the local level while the SCADA controller acts 
independently for other supervisory control functions and not have any dependence on 
centralised control.  Due to the local responsiveness, the intelligent controller can easily 
support enhanced fault location through line monitors, making automatic switching decisions 
and managing distributed generation connections [33]. 
These technologies work together to automate power restoration, reducing both the duration 
and impact of power interruptions while minimising maintenance and operational costs. The 
impact on customers affected by the outage is also minimised through automatic restoration 
of power supply to unaffected sections of the network. Where back feed capabilities are 
available the service to affected customers is also restored by transferring them to an 
alternative supply. The minimised number of affected customers and the associated customer 
minutes of interruption are the primary benefits of reliability improvement in a power 
distribution system. [61] 
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Figure 2-12 shows an algorithm a smart distribution system follows during outage 
conditions, where fault detection, isolation of the faulty part of the network and service 
restoration to a healthy part of the network is done automatically.  FLISR technology makes 
time, resources and corporate commitment key components for success through 
implementation of greater automation, network visibility and integration when compared to 
traditional technologies.  
A key component for any smart grid technology to effectively and efficiently perform the 
work intended is the communications network for remote monitoring and control of 
technologies and systems. FLISR communication networks need greater flexibility as they 
function under conditions where the grid itself is not fully functional. The two-way 
communications network needs to have adequate coverage and capability to interface all grid 
operations. The placement of automatic switches in the network is very critical. If you move 
the location of the automatic switch, the frequency and the duration of an outage changes 
accordingly, this is demonstrated on PowerFactory simulations in the later Chapters[52]. 
 
Figure 2-12: Automated monitoring and control of MV network 
2.10 Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and Smart meter for outage 
management 
Conventional metering functionalities include meter reading, switching services which are 
connecting and disconnecting the meter, and supporting customer billing requirements. All 
these tasks are achieved manually. 
Prior to introducing AMI, certain power  utilities including Eskom used automated meter 
reading (AMR) systems in some of their sites, which included electronic meters and one‐way 
communications to reduce the necessity for manual meter reading. AMI introduces two‐way 
communications capabilities and allows smart technologies for improvement of operational 
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reconfiguration 
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new meters, communications networks, and information systems, as well as system 
integration [52]. 
 
Figure 2-13: AMI overview diagram  [62] 
2.10.1  Information Systems for AMI  
Full integration of smart meters and a communications network that supports various types 
of functions is crucial, for a utility to appreciate full benefits of AMI systems effectively, and 
control the complete set of smart meter functions. For example, varieties of utility operations 
that are supported by the smart meter include:  
a) Meter Data Management Systems (MDMSs), which process and store interval 
load data for billing systems, web portals, and other information systems.  
b) Customer Information Systems (CISs), which process data from MDMS and are 
linked with billing systems for storage of data on customer locations, demographics, 
contact information, and past billing information.  
c) Outage Management Systems (OMSs), which process data about meter on/off 
status to locate outages and often connect with geographic information systems 
(GIS) for managing of resources during restoration times.  
d) Distribution Management Systems (DMSs), which process data on outages and 
customer voltage levels for system reliability and voltage and volt‐ampere reactive 
enhancement measures. 
For the purpose of this study outage management systems are further looked at as measures 
of minimising frequency and duration of outages while reducing maintenance and 
operational costs savings through optimal use of resources in the power distribution system. 





















Smart fault path indicators notify the control centre when faults occur, so does an outage 
notification system through smart meters. The difference between these two outage 
notification systems is that over and above outage notification, there are more other added 
benefits that come with AMI technologies. In the traditional system, a utility will get notified 
of a fault by the customer calling in. 
The scope of this study is restricted to the smart grid technologies that can be applied in the 
MV network for improving the reliability of electric power delivered to the customers and 
improve overall system performance as discussed in Table 2-1. Currently, there are numbers 
of smart grid technologies already available in the market while others are still in the 
research and development stage. The main emphasis in this study is on the technologies 
which have already been implemented in the field either as a commercially available product 
or as a pilot project as listed on Table 2-1, and are from the following well-known 
companies. 
Control center operators check if all affected areas 
are attended to before repair crew leave site 
Start 
Outage detection 
on the meter 
Outage alert is detected from the meter the data is 
processed via AMI and send to the control center 
Repair team is sent to site for repairs 
‘Power on’ alert is sent from the meter to the 
control center, immediately after the repairs 
End 
Figure 2-14: Outage management through AMI 
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a) ABB (http://www.abb.com/) 
b) Siemens (http://www.siemens.com/)  
c) S&C Electric Company (http://www.sandc.com/)  
d) GE Energy (http://www.gepower.com/) 
e) SEL (http://www.selinc.com/)  
f) G&W Electric (http://www.gwelec.com/)  
g) Schneider (http://www.schneider.com) 
h) Silver Springs Networks (http://www.silverspringnet.com) 
i) Varentec (http://www.varentec.com) 
j) Tollgrade Lighthouse (http://www.tollgrade.com) 
2.11  The state of Eskom in Smart Grid 
It is important to know where Eskom stands with regards to available tools and infrastructure 
to support a smart grid. During the year 2012, the South African National Energy 
Development Institute (SANEDI) launched the South African Smart Grid Initiative (SASGI). 
Amongst other things its main objectives were to draw up industry expertise and develop a 
smart grid vision for the country. It is important to note that the current grid was not built 
with the 21st century challenges in mind. The network is limited to design issues and cannot 
allow the intelligence to fully migrate into smart grid. Also it does not allow bi-directional 
flow of energy. The fact that SASGI was launched in 2012 shows that migration to smart 
grid is still in early stages in South Africa. And there are not many tools available yet to 
support smart grids [63]. 
Supervisory functionality is provided by SCADA through the use of Energy Management 
System (EMS) and Distribution Management System (DMS) functionalities.   Metering is 
the only interface the Eskom has with the customers, which is used for data collection, 
billing and load forecasting analysis. It is therefore evident that there is a huge gap between 
consumer and power utility with respect to fully achieving a smart grid. The benefits will 
add value to a more improved and intelligent network but the implementation and migration 
will be a costly exercise that requires huge capital investment. [64]. 
The electricity infrastructure in the country is in urgent need of refurbishing and expanding 
to meet demand and incorporating additional sustainable energy possibilities. Eskom needs 
to establish a 15% reserve margin which has been dropped to 5-6% since 2007   In addition, 
Eskom is facing its individual challenges with regards to aging of asset fleet.  In the past the 
maintenance has been delayed and running of the plant to its full capability to meet demand 
and to avoid the economic and social impact of load shedding [65].  
Eskom is currently evaluating the potential options of different sensor technologies as shown 







Table 2-2: Some of the current initiatives taken by Eskom [64] 
Assessment of Visualisation 
tools 
Replacement of existing 
SCADA system to EMS and 
DMS 
Metering system (AMI) 
Distribution Automation 
(completed 3 sites) 
Utility Load Manager Research in sensor 
technologies applicable 
to Eskom 
Pilot of Phasor Measurement 
Units 


















CHAPTER 3  
RELIABILITY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Reliability 
Reliability in a power distribution system is the probability of a network or piece of 
equipment effectively performing its intended function within a specified duration and under 
specified operating conditions. Reliability is associated with sudden failures of products or 
services and understanding why these failures occur and the impact thereof is crucial in 
terms of reliability improvement.  
3.2 Network outages 
The major cause of network outages or supply interruptions to customers is component 
“failure”, and the frequency of which the failure occurs. A failure is defined as any issue 
with a power system component that causes any of the following events [66, 67]: 
a) Limited or complete plant shutdown or below-standard plant operation; 
b) Undesirable performance of operator’s equipment; 
c) Operation of the electrical protective relaying or emergency operation of the plant 
electrical system; 
d) De-energization of any electric circuit, component, or equipment. 
Power system components can fail in numerous ways and are classified as either active or 
passive failures [1]. 
a) Active failures are defined as a component or equipment failure mode that causes the 
operation of the upstream breaker around the failed component and can result in the 
other energized components and branches being removed from service. The failed 
component is isolated, and the protection breakers are reclosed. This results in part 
or full restoration of supply to all load points. 
b) A passive failure is when a component failure mode does not cause operation of 
protection breakers and does not interfere with the rest of the system. Service is 
restored by repairing or replacing the failed device. Examples are open circuits, 
inadvertent opening of breakers or stuck breaker conditions. 
For the purpose of this study, only active failures are considered. They classify outages as 
either scheduled outages (planned outages) or unscheduled outages (unplanned outages) 
[68]. Only unplanned outages are considered for this study. 
The main reasons why failures occur include [69, 70]:  
a) The product or service is not fit for purpose intended for or inherent design issues 
b) Overstressed piece of equipment  
c) Component wear-out which eventually lead to failures.  
d) Incorrect specifications or may be applied incorrectly.  
e) Human errors or misuse of the equipment.  
f) Using the equipment outside operating environment specified for. 
Generally the load and strength of the component is known, however element of uncertainty 
will always be there. The actual strength values of any set of components will differ; some 
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will be fairly strong, while others may come up as reasonably weak, but most will come up 
as fairly average strength. Likewise some loads will be greater than others but mostly they 
will be average.  If there is an overlap between load strength relationships as illustrated by 
the two distributions in the Figure 3-1, then failures will occur. Therefore there is a need for 
a safety margin to ensure that there is no overlap of these distributions. 
 
Figure 3-1: Overlap of load and strength relationship [69] 
In order to ensure a good relationship, it is clear that the causes of failure need to be 
identified and controlled. Indeed reliability engineering objectives include:  
a) To apply engineering knowledge to reduce the probability or frequency of failures  
b) To perform trend analysis, identify and correct the causes of failures  and 
c)  To determine ways of coping with failures that do occur such as reducing the outage 
duration 
The scope of this study includes the application of engineering solutions to evaluate smart 
technology for improvement of reliability in a power distribution system by reducing 
duration and frequency of both momentary and permanent outages and improving overall 
system performance. 
Voltage sags, sustained and momentary interruptions are three major aspects of the reliability 
of electric power supply delivered to the customers. A sustained interruption for MV 
networks is an unplanned interruption with a duration ≥ 5 minutes. A momentary 
interruption is a brief disturbance in the electric service of greater than 3 s but less than 5 
min. Voltage sag is a sudden reduction in the voltage, for a period of between 20 ms and 3 s, 
of any or all of the phase voltages of a single-phase or a polyphase supply. The duration of a 
voltage dip is the time measured from the moment the voltage drops to below 0.9 per unit 
[71]. The degree of reliability may be measured by the frequency, duration, and severity [1].  
3.3 Reliability Indices 
Reliability indices are used to assess history statistics and to expose developments, patterns, 
determine challenges and indicate how and where reliability can be improved. They are 
classified into customer load point indices and system indices [72-73].  
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A detailed description on reliability indices is found in [1]. The indices that are commonly 
used for benchmarking and reporting are summarised below. There are also internal indices 
that Eskom uses such as SAIDI-N and SAIFI-N where transformer interruptions duration 
and frequency are measured [74]. Reliability indices also allow customers and investors to 
make an informed decision about the security of supply. 
Load point indices are indices that measure the anticipated number of outages and their 
duration for a specific customer include factors such as: 
a) Interruption frequency;  
b) Interruption duration;  
c) Availability.  
System indices measure overall system reliability and can be used to compare the effects of 
different designs, strengthening alternatives and maintenance strategies on the system’s 
reliability. They can be further divided into customer-based indices and load-based indices. 
The customer-based system indices are used to analyse and evaluate different smart 
technology interventions in this study. 
3.4 Customer-based system indices   
SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index): The SAIDI of a network indicates 
the average duration of a sustained interruption the customer would experience per annum. 
For example, if a network has a SAIDI of 40 hours, a customer supplied by that network will 
not have electricity for an average of 40 hours in the year.  It is commonly measured in 
customer minutes or customer hours of interruption. Mathematically SAIDI is expressed as: 
SAIDI =∑ 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝.𝑎
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
      (1) 
SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index): The SAIFI of a network 
indicates how often on average (frequency) the customer connected would experience a 
sustained interruption per annum. For example, if a network has a SAIFI of 20, a customer 
supplied by that network will not have electricity for an average of 20 times in the year. 
Mathematically SAIFI is expressed as: 
SAIFI = 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑝.𝑎
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
     (2) 
SAIFI-N (System Average Interruption Frequency Index-Network): The SAIFI-N of a 
network indicates how often on average (frequency) a transformer connected would 
experience a sustained interruption per annum. Only the number of events (no state changes) 
are used in the calculation and the number of transformers connected are used in the 
denominator. Mathematically SAIFI-N is expressed as: 
SAIFI-N = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎 𝑝.𝑎
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
    (3) 
SAIDI-N (System Average Interruption Duration Index-Network): The SAIDI-N of a 
network indicates the average duration of a sustained interruption a connected transformer 
would experience per annum. Only the number of sustained events (no state changes) are 
used in the calculation and the number of transformers connected are used in the 
denominator. It is commonly measured in transformer minutes or transformer hours of 
interruption. Mathematically SAIDI-N is expressed as: 
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 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼 𝑁 = ∑
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑝.𝑎
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
     (4) 
SAIDI-N and SAIFI-N are internal network performance KPI’s that measure the interruption 
performance of the network. These KPI’s do not take into account the amount of switching 
performed on the network in order to fault find. It is assumed that a customer regards 
himself/herself as off until supply is restored permanently. In terms of the network 
performance, the number of events affecting the customer is more important than the number 
of state changes recorded. 
3.5 Unplanned outage duration 
The overall outage duration for each event can be broken down into single steps as illustrated 
in Figure 3-2. SAIDI and SAIFI values are calculated from the moment the fault is captured 
in the system. Measured outage duration does not represent the entire outage duration, 
because it does not reflect the moment the fault took place. It depends on the response time 
of the customer to report the fault. Smart technology will bring in real time monitoring, 
where the organisation will be aware of the fault the moment it happens and actions will be 
taken thereafter. Each of these steps is further explained. 
 
Figure 3-2: key components for overall outage duration on MV network 
Fault occurs: this is the time before the fault is reported and captured on the system, only 
known to the customer or through the RTU. To quantify the exact time depends on the 
individual customer reaction to report the fault or through network visibility on the RTU. 
Hence SAIDI and SAIFI are calculated based on the measured outage duration and not 
overall outage duration. Some of the smart grid benefits may be realised during the overall 
outage duration. 
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Dispatch time: the call has been logged on the system during this period through customer 
reporting or through Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) alarms at the station and the operator has 
been advised to travel to site. 
Travel time: the time for an operator to travel to site to operate the first disconnector or 
isolator. 
Sectionalising time: customers are partially restored during this period through back feeding 
and network reconfiguration. The operator is performing switching (opening and closing of 
breakers and disconnectors) on different locations along the network with the aim of 
isolating the faulted part of the network. 
Fault finding time: the faulted section is already isolated from the rest of the network at this 
stage; an operator is doing a visual inspection on the components with the intent of 
identifying the faulted equipment. 
Repair time: the faulted equipment is repaired at this stage and the customers affected are 
only those connected to that section. Fairly reasonable assumptions for different equipment 
were made. 
Restore time: after replacing or repairing the faulted equipment the network is returned to 
its original state. 
The combination of these intervals represent the overall outage duration that is experienced 
by the customer from the moment the interruption takes place. Planned outages are when 
maintenance work is being undertaken. Therefore the total outages that are experienced by 
the customer on the MV feeder include both planned and unplanned SAIDI. 
𝑈𝐷 = 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 + 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛    (5) 
Where: 
𝑈𝐷= total outages experienced by the customer on the MV network 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 = unplanned SAIDI for a specific feeder 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛 = planned SAIDI for a specific feeder 
3.6 Evaluation techniques 
The reliability of a power distribution system has been calculated by applying different 
evaluation techniques. Mainly two approaches are predominantly used: analytical and 
simulation[1]. In this study both approaches are applied whereby expected performance is 
modelled, given the specific network topology, past performance, customer numbers, 
operating environment, etc.  
Due to the amount of computing time needed for the simulation technique, the majority of 
analyses that have been conducted in the past are analytical. Analytical methods evaluate the 
system by means of a mathematical model, and calculate the reliability indices by means of 
numerical solutions. Simulation methods evaluate the reliability indices by simulating the 
real practice and random behaviour of the system. Therefore, the method treats events as 
series of real experiments[1]. A few of the commonly-used reliability evaluation techniques 
are further discussed in this section. 
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3.6.1 Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA)  
FMEA is a technique that identifies all possible component failure states and their associated 
impact on system reliability [72, 75]. The following information is required for each 
component:  
a) List of failure modes;  
b) Possible root cause of each failure mode;  
c) How is the system affected by each failure mode;  
d) Likelihood of each failure mode occurring;  
e) Possible actions to mitigate the failure rate   
3.6.2 Markov models  
These models are often used for quantitative reliability analysis. A Markov model describes 
the different states of a system and the transitions between these states. In reliability 
modelling, these states are referred to as failures and repairs.  
These two basic assumptions are made with regards to system behaviour 
a) No memory exist on the system state, no events occurred prior to the current state 
are taken into consideration, therefore the future probability of events is only a 
function of the existing state of the system.  
b) The state of the system is stationary, meaning that the probability of conversions 
between one state to another is constant and does not vary with time.  
In simple terms a two-state model can be used to describe the system, as shown in Figure 3-
3. Availability is represented by one state of the system, and unavailability for the other. The 
systems are therefore either in the available state, illustrated by “U”, or in the failed state, 
illustrated by “R”. The MTTR is the repair rate. At the start of the model, the distribution 
line is assumed to be in UP state, meaning the system is in service or operational. 
Mean Time To Failure,  𝑇𝑇𝐹 = 1
λ
       (6) 
Mean Time To Repair,  𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 = 1
𝑟
      (7) 
Availability, 𝑈 = 𝑇𝑇𝐹
(𝑇𝑇𝐹+𝑇𝑇𝑅)
        (8) 
     Unavailability 𝑅 = 𝑇𝑇𝑅
(𝑇𝑇𝐹+𝑇𝑇𝑅)
       (9) 
The availability is the fraction of time when the component is in service; the unavailability is 
the fraction of time when it is in repair; and  
𝑈 + 𝑅 = 1.0            (10) 
 






A three states Markov model is shown in Figure 3-4. A network state in between the 
available and failed state is included; this is a state before switching has occurred in 
reliability modelling. 
 
Figure 3-4: Three state Markov model [72] 
Another model that considers passive failures is shown in Figure 3-5. It shows that the 
system can only be transferred to either switching state or the repair state, if it is available. 
This transition is referred to passive failures. Many studies relating to reliability analysis 
have successfully applied Markov models. 
 
Figure 3-5: Markov model with passive state [72] 
A Markov model was used in this study where a radial distribution system consists of a set of 
series components, including lines, transformers, isolators, bus bars, etc. was used to 
calculate anticipated SAIDI and SAIFI values. A customer connected to any load point of 
such a system requires all components between himself and the supply fully functional. 





















Calculations were performed on a small network model developed by the author to 
demonstrate the understanding of how the system is supposed to behave when doing 
PowerFactory simulations. It is not possible to perform calculations on a complex network 
because of the huge number of components and the process will be time consuming and 
tedious hence there is software designed for this job.  
The past performance of the faults was analysed to develop the failure rate (𝜆𝑖) and outage 
duration (𝑟𝑖) of each component. The three basic reliability parameters of average failure rate 
(𝜆𝑠), average outage time (𝑟𝑠) and average annual outage time (𝑈𝑠) were evaluated and 
calculated for historical analysis approach. It is a normally found practice that lines and 
cables have a failure rate which is approximately proportional to their length. More details 
about equipment failure rates and high level assumptions that were made will be further 
discussed in later chapters. 
 𝜆𝑠 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑖            (11) 




                          (13) 
3.7 Unplanned SAIDI and SAIFI approach 
The approach followed in this study started with a very basic model and then fuses were 
added on a similar model. Thereafter analysis in PowerFactory was performed. Transformer 
fuses are used on MV networks to isolate MV/LV transformer faults. These fuses can be 
installed just before a transformer, at a tee-off to a transformer or on a section of line[37]. 
The intent is that when there is a transformer fault, the fuse must operate to isolate the 
faulted transformer from the rest of the network. The position of the fuse has a significant 
impact on the number of customers interrupted and the outage duration. For the purpose of 
this study it was assumed that all fuses are installed at the transformer and no fuses are 
installed on the backbone.  
3.8 Customer restoration 
The following factors were considered for the SAIDI calculation:  
a) If a customer is affected, the customer will be affected for at least the response time, 
i.e. the time it takes an operator to drive to site, open an isolator on one/both side(s) 
of the fault and closes the substation breaker and/or back feed point.  
b) The customers that are not restored will remain unsupplied for the full outage time.  
c) Supply can be restored to some of the interrupted customers before the failed 
component has been repaired. The percentage of customers that can be restored 
depends on the isolating equipment, back feed capability and configuration of the 
network 




      (14) 
𝐶𝐼𝐷 = (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐿 + 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 × 𝐹𝑅𝐷 + 𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐹 + 𝑇𝑟𝑓𝑟 × 𝐹𝑅𝑇) × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷 +
(𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐿 × 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐿) × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑅 + (𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐹 × 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐹)𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑅 + (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 × 𝐹𝑅𝐷 ×
𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐷 × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑅) + (𝑇𝑟𝑓𝑟 × 𝐹𝑅𝑇 × 𝑅𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑇)𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑅  (15) 
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The unplanned SAIFI algorithm is similar to SAIDI except that frequency is considered 
instead of duration. The SAIFI algorithm for a feeder with fuses as well as smart technology 




      (16) 
𝐶𝐼 = (𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐿 × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷 + (𝑓𝑢𝑠𝑒 × 𝐹𝑅𝐹 × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷) + (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐 × 𝐹𝑅𝐷 × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷) +
(𝑇𝑟𝑓𝑟 × 𝐹𝑅𝑇 × 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝐷)     (17) 
Where: 
Line = total line length in km (km) 
Fuse = total number of fuses on a feeder 
Trfr = total number of transformers on a feeder 
Disc = total number of isolators on a feeder 
CustD = customer interrupted for dispatch, travelling and sectionalising time 
CustR = customer interrupted for fault finding, repair and switching the line back to its 
original state 
CustT = total number of customers in a specific feeder  
CID = customer interruptions duration 
CI = customer interruptions  
FRL = line failure rate (occ/km/a) 
FRD = Isolator failure rate (occ/a) 
FRF = fuse failure rate (occ/a) 
FRT = transformer failure rate (occ/a) 
Dtime = sum of dispatch, travelling and sectionalising time 
RtimeT = sum of fault finding, transformer repair and switching the line back to its original 
state 
RtimeL = sum of fault finding, line repair and switching the line back to its original state 
RtimeF = sum of fault finding, fuse repair and switching the line back to its original state 
RtimeD = sum of fault finding, isolator repair and switching the line back to its original state.  
These indicators yield a good picture of the quality of service of the entire system. The larger 
the value of these indicators, the poorer the quality of the grid will be and vice versa. For 
each delimited segment i between two switches, if a fault occurs on the segment i, reliability 














                (20) 
Where: 
𝐷𝑝𝑐(𝑖) = outage duration for the segment i (min) 
𝑁𝑐𝑢𝑠(𝑖) = number of customers experiencing an outage 
𝑁𝑝𝑐(𝑖) = number of times an outage is experienced 
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡(𝑖) = total number of customers 
𝑃𝑝𝑐(𝑖) = the total rating of the outage 
To calculate the total IND reliability indicator, where IND represents the SAIDI, SAIFI or 
ENS, the following formula is used: 
𝐼𝑁𝐷 = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝐷(𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1              (21) 
Where n is the total number of segments in a system, the calculation of  𝐷𝑝𝑐(𝑖) , 𝑁𝑝𝑐(𝑖) , 
𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡(𝑖) and  𝑃𝑝𝑐(𝑖) depends on the switching device used, the location of the devices as well 
as the status of the system . For example, if the main feeder is sub divided into 3 segments 
such as 𝐴1, 𝐴2 and 𝐴3. Equations are re defined as follows: 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼(𝑖) = λ × 𝐿𝑖 × (𝑇𝑑 + 𝑇𝑚 ×
𝑁𝑖
𝑁1+𝑁2+𝑁3
)   (22) 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼(𝑖) = λ × 𝐿𝑖 × (
𝑁𝑖
𝑁1+𝑁2+𝑁3
)    (23) 
𝐸𝑁𝑆(𝑖) = λ × 𝐿𝑖 × (𝑇𝑑 × 𝑃𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝑇𝑚 × 𝑃𝑖)                (24) 
Where: 
λ = conductor failure rate 
𝑇𝑑  = outage times for stages 1 and 2 
𝑇𝑚 = outage time for stage 3 
𝑁𝑖 = number of affected customers for 𝐴1 
𝐿𝑖 = conductor length for 𝐴1 
𝑃𝑖 = total affected power for 𝐴1 
𝑃𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 = total power for the whole feeder 
𝐿𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟 = total length for the whole feeder 
SAIDI, SAIFI and ENS for the whole feeder are therefore equal to the amount of SAIDI, 
SAIFI and ENS for the three sub segments. Therefore: 
𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟−𝑗 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐷𝐼(𝑖)
3
𝑗=1       (25) 
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𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟−𝑗 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼(𝑖)
3
𝑗=1      (26) 
𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟−𝑗 = ∑ 𝐸𝑁𝑆(𝑖)
3
𝑗=1                 (27) 



















               (30) 
3.9 Reliability specialized simulation software 
A number of specialised software packages are available in the market for reliability 
modelling of electrical networks including: 
a) PowerFactory,  
b) NEPLAN, 
c) ReticMaster, and  
d) PSS/E   
e) MATLAB 
These packages require detailed network models to model the expected reliability of power 
networks. When the mean durations are modelled in PowerFactory all failure and load 
models are analysed through a Markov model[77]. The reliability calculation flow diagram is 
shown in Figure 3-6. 
The failure models define how system components can fail, how often they might fail and 
how long it takes to repair them when they fail. This information is based on the trend 
analysis and history performance of the system. The load models can be based on a user’s 
specification or they can consist of a few possible load demands. System state is when there 
















System state generated 
Statistical Evaluation e.g. SAIDI, SAIFI 
Figure 3-6: Basic reliability analysis flow diagram 
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FEA takes the power system through a number of post-fault operational states that can 
include: 
a) Fault clearance by tripping of protection breakers or fuses. 
b) Fault separation by opening separating switches. 
c) Power restoration by closing normally open switches. 
d) Overload alleviation by load transfer and load shedding. 
e) Voltage constraint alleviation by load shedding  
The data that is provided by the system state generation module together with FEA results 





















CHAPTER 4  
KZN OU FAULTS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a detailed analysis of KZN OU fault data from January 2010 till January 
2014 and the anticipated effect of smart technology intervention. The aim is to demonstrate 
that when network visibility is improved, the outage reduction of as little as 10 minute per 
event has a significant improvement on the reliability of the power distribution system in 
terms of SAIDI improvement. Smart grid costs benefit analysis is conducted and the KZN 
OU performances as well as the sample networks selected are also discussed. 
4.2 Eskom Distribution network 
Eskom Distribution currently supplies more than 4.5 million customers through 8 000 MV 
feeders ranging from 1 kV to 33 kV, most of which have limited redundancy and back-feed 
capability. These feeders are geographically spread across South Africa as highlighted in 
Figure 4-1. The black marks inside the map indicate MV networks.  
A test network model was developed in PowerFactory to validate the application of several 
smart technologies thereafter the methodology was validated on the few selected KZN OU 
networks. Eskom has nine Operating Units, it is important to note that even though sample 
networks were taken from the KZN OU, this methodology is applicable to the rest of the 
OUs with similar network characteristics. 
 
Figure 4-1: Geographic view of Eskom MV network across South Africa [78] 
4.3 KZN OU faults analysis 
KwaZulu Natal is located in a very interesting part of the country: there are coastal and 
inland areas. Along the coastal network faults may occur as a result of corrosion, vegetation, 
sugar cane fires and pollution. Inland network faults may occur due to veld fires and soil 
erosion. These makes the KZN OU unique in that all fault types from across the country 
occur on KZN networks. Currently the KZN OU is supplying 805 000 customers through 
1200 MV feeders, which equates to 45 000km of length.  
35 
 
An analysis of faults for the KwaZulu-Natal Operating Unit (KZN OU) MV network was 
conducted for the period January 2010 to January 2014. There are 595 network feeders 
which have approximate 20 000 faults. The outcome of the analysis is summarised in Figure 
4-2. 
 
Figure 4-2: KZN OU faults analysis 
As seen in Figure 4-2, a substantial proportion of the MV network faults are transient faults 
which are caused by factors including tree branches touching the conductors, birds and 
weather. It should be noted that the duration for all these faults are greater or equal to 5 
minutes and this means that they contribute to SAIDI measures. Transient faults less than 5 
minutes are not counted as an interruption and therefore does not contribute to SAIDI. 
Eskom Distribution is continuously under considerable pressure to improve network 
performance and ensure future performance in international benchmarking analyses. 
Executive management is constantly investigating mechanisms to make a significant change 
in performance levels as measured by the reliability indices[79].  
4.4 KZN OU Performance overview 
The KZN OU SAIDI and SAIFI targets for the past financial years are shown in Figure 4-3; 
the downward trend on SAIDI shows that the target each year is to reduce overall outage 
duration while minimising the customer impact.  
Frequency of occurance (%)











Figure 4-3: KZN OU SAID and SAIFI for the past 3 years 
A detailed analysis that illustrates the month to month performance is shown in Figure 4-4, 
the limit for the 2014/15 financial year was 41, and the actual was 41,58. 
KZN OU SAIDI and SAIFI for 2014/15 financial year 
 
Figure 4-4: KZN OU 2014/15 performance 
4.5 SAIDI and SAIFI for the KZN OU zones 
The KZN OU is divided into three zones i.e. Pietermaritzburg, Newcastle and Empangeni. It 
is noted from Figure 4-5 that the Empangeni zone contributes significantly to the SAIDI 
because the majority of their networks are long rural networks. As a result their limit is 














































Figure 4-5: SAIDI &SAIFI for KZN OU zones 
4.6 Sample networks selection 
The sample networks used were selected from the Pietermaritzburg and Empangeni zones. 
This is because both these are exposed to different environmental conditions and their 
characteristics are quite different. Wartburg NB 22 and 23 11kV overhead lines can be 100% 
backed from each other and they are located in the Pietermaritzburg zone. Mtonjaneni NB1 
11kV overhead line is a long rural network that is located in the Empangeni zone. More 
details and simulation results on these networks are further explained in Chapter 6. The 
selected networks are overhead lines because generally overhead networks contribute 
significantly to poor SAIDI and SAIFI values due to: 
a) Outages caused by vegetation 
b) Live wire contact faults 
c) Conductor failures 
d) Storm related faults 
e) Structure failures 
f) Bird Related faults 
All of these are the major contributors to the KZN OU fault causes. This means if the focus 
can be placed on overhead networks, it will help improve the overall reliability of the 
networks by reducing outage duration while improving customer hours due to sustained 
interruptions. 
Even though selected networks are overhead, the evaluated smart devices in Table 2-1 are 
also applicable to underground networks. Mostly cable / underground networks are short 
networks which are exposed to fewer faults due to: 
a) Reduced live wire contacts 
b) No momentary outages caused by vegetation 
c) No structure failure caused by vehicle accidents 
d) Reduced storm related faults 
Generally, cable networks do not contribute much on longer durations due to sustained 
interruptions because they are not prone to faults causes such as tree branches touching the 
conductors, wind, animals and storm. However when they fail, they experience longer 
outage duration which leads to more customer hours per single event. This is mainly due to 
operational process involved associated with its maintenance.  
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4.7 Equipment distribution 
The reliability modelling applied in this study does not take into account the actual 
contribution of customers along the length of the feeder due to the unavailability of this 
information at the time of this study.   The homogenous model is therefore considered, 
meaning that all customers are evenly distributed beyond all transformers, as per the total 
number of customers on a specific feeder. 
4.8 High level system model 
The key is to analyse the network’s characteristics, configuration and customer type before 
implementing a specific technology, as highlighted in Figure 4-6. This will also provide 








4.9 Equipment failure rate, maintenance frequency and repair duration 
Failure in a system is inevitable however the impact of failure can be minimized through the 
application of smart technology. As discussed in Chapter 2, smart technology has the ability 
to improve system reliability through reducing the frequency of  outages and the duration of 
outages. 
Travel times to site; travelling speed for fault finding, repair times, used for reliability 
analysis were based on performance history of the feeders as well as interviews and 
interactions made with site engineers and operators. Visits were made to different sites at 
Stanger Technical Service Centre (TSC) KZN OU, which falls under the Empangeni zone to 
validate the information. Reference with [79] was made to ensure that the information used 
is according to Eskom’s standard practice. Component failure rates used for reliability 
studies were taken from [79].  
Key Assumptions 
a) KZN OU MV networks are maintained and operated well according to Eskom 
maintenance standards and are in a fairly good condition 
b) LV networks are excluded, although MV/LV transformers are included;  
c)  Only overhead lines are included;  
d) Equipment loadings are within the design limits;  
e) No network component on the relevant part of the Distribution System is out of 
service due to an outage. 
According to [80] , all Eskom MV networks were classified based on a spatial analysis, 
considering both network characteristics and operational environments, and were classified 
according to environmental modifier types as mentioned in Table 4-1. Because 
environmental factors play a significant role in terms of power distribution network 




zones, fault causes and 
customer type 
Select suitable 
technologies based on 
the network 
characteristics 
Figure 4-6: High level system model 
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performance, this line type information was taken into consideration when populating 
equipment failure rates information. 
Table 4-1: Environmental modifier line type information 
Type  Lightning  Vegetation  Corrosive pollution  
Type 1  Low  Low  Low  
Type 2  Low  Low  High  
Type 3  High  Low  Low  
Type 4  High  Low  High  
Type 5  Low  High  Low  
Type 6  Low  High  High  
Type 7  High  High  Low  
Type 8  High  High  High  
According to the fault trend analysis for the Mtonjaneni NB1, Wartburg NB 22 and NB23 
networks, it was concluded that they fall under type 2 in term of environmental factors, 
therefore their failure rates information were assigned as such.  
The failure rates applied in the reliability analysis refers to sustained interruptions only, as 
shown in Table 4-2. No momentary interruptions were considered for the analysis. The 
failure rate of a fuse refers to a failure to operate, meaning that the protection on the fuse did 
not operate to isolate the faulty transformer from the rest of the network. This is simply 
classified as fuse failure. It does not refer to a fuse that needs to be replaced due to a 
protection operation because this will imply the fuse operated correctly and did not fail.  
Table 4-2: Component failures 







Type 4  Type 
5  
Type 6  Type 7  Type 8  Unit  
Lines & 
branch lines 
10.6  17.5  13.6  19.5  15.2  15.1  15.3  19.5  /100 
km·a  
Cables  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  /100 
km·a  
Switch  0.009  0.014  0.012  0.028  0.008  0.012  0.013  0.022  /a  




0.048  0.062  0.052  0.065  0.060  0.060  0.056  0.070  /a  
4.10 Component-specific repair times  
The outage time associated with all faults is not the same, i.e. the time required to repair a 
transformer fault is much longer than the time required repairing a line fault. The outage 
duration associated with each of the different components should therefore be considered as 
shown in Table 4-3. Again these assumptions were based on the fault data analysis as well as 





Table 4-3: Component repair times 
Equipment Repair times (hours) 
Transformer 5.00 
Lines and lateral line 2.00 
Cables 5.00 
Fuses 0.35 
Disconnect / Isolator 0.50 
Travelling time 2.00 
 
Having investigated the application of smart technologies and its anticipated outcome in 
Chapter 2, an investigation across the entire KZN OU MV faults data from 2010-2014 was 
undertaken in MATLAB. Based on the savings shown by the fault path indicator during the 
work done by the author[81], the question posed is, what the impact on these networks will 
be if these FPI or any other smart device that makes the network visible are installed? A 
change in the SAIDI value would indicate the value of these. 
A further analysis of fault data was conducted to determine the SAIDI and manipulate the 
recorded customer hours to indicate the value of smart technology. The minimum number of 
customers per line was 10. While the data is not perfect and there may be some mismatch, 
there is value in the results presented. 
The histogram in Figure 4-7 illustrates the distribution of lengths of lines within the analysed 
data, where it can be seen that the majority of lines are below 100 km. It is anticipated that 
after installing fault path indicators or any smart device that increases network visibility; the 
SAIDI for these lines will improve simply due to the length of the line and the operational 
procedure for repairs. Most of the time is spent on sectionalising and fault finding as 
discussed in the previous chapters, this involves temporal restoration of healthy part of the 
network. This does not tell the perfect picture as it excludes the number of customers. A 
better representation would be a histogram relating the number of customers to length and 
number of lines.  
 
Figure 4-7: Line length distribution 
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Figure 4-8 illustrates that the number of customers for the lengths of the line. Comparing the 
two graphs it is now evident that the majority of customers exist in the networks over 100 
km. 
 
Figure 4-8: Customer distribution 
Further correlating all the information in a single plot in Figure 4-9 confirms this point that 
there are fewer lines of length but the total customers are much larger. The small blue sphere 
for line lengths less than 25 km indicates a large number of lines but a small number of 
customers, whereas the large yellow sphere for networks between 125 and 150 km indicates 
a low number of lines and high number of customers.  
 
Figure 4-9: Correlating customers and lines 
As SAIDI is dependent on the number of customers and the fault time, it becomes critically 
important to focus on the lines with a large number of customers and long fault durations i.e. 
lines from 100 to 400 km. Smart technology that makes this visible is key to reducing the 
fault finding and maintenance durations and hence improving SAIDI by reducing the 
customer hours. However lines with fewer customers cannot be excluded totally as the 
customer type information needs to be taken into consideration. 
Figure 4-10 illustrates the SAIDI for different kilometres of line. The x axis illustrates 0 to 
80 km, this indicates the SAIDI value for every length of line above the value shown. It is 
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illustrated that the SAIDI increases as you exclude the lower lengths of line; this is expected 
as any fault on a longer line with more customers would result in more customer hours and a 
greater SAIDI value.  SAIDI is directly proportional to the duration of the affected 
customers, which is the duration of the affected customers over the customer base within 
specified boundaries. As expected outage duration is longer in long lines because more time 
is spent on sectionalising and fault finding as opposed to short lines. Therefore this graph is 
behaving as expected and the sudden reduction on SAIDI is because the line is long but 
feeding few customers. 
Two savings are illustrated by Figure 4-10, the first is just a 10 minute saving per fault and 
the second is a 1.67 min saving per km per fault. These time estimates are based on the test 
model which is further discussed in the next chapter.  It is evident that a 10 minute saving 
per fault significantly reduces the SAIDI value, of more significance is the saving in SAIDI 
produced by the 1.67 min saving per km per fault. The value reduces as the length of line 
increases, again indicating that the long lines with high customers may be the focus for 
network visibility and means that by installing fault path indicators on strategic positions on 
the network, the operator will go and operate the correct isolator to isolate the fault from the 
rest of the network instead of doing multiple operations during sectionalising depending on 
other factors including the terrain and environmental.  
 
Figure 4-10: SAIDI - KZN OU MV networks 
4.11 Cost benefit analysis 
The Distribution Network Code requires all shared network investments to be justified on a 
least economic life-cycle cost basis. The shared network is that network that is not dedicated 
to a single customer. This implies quantification of the following typical costs and 
benefits[79]: 
4.11.1 Life-cycle costs to be considered 




b) Infrastructure operating costs, including any associated telecommunications costs. 
c) Planned maintenance and refurbishment costs to ensure the infrastructure performs 
as per the design for the expected asset life. 
d) Unplanned maintenance and repair costs to restore failed equipment back to service. 
4.11.2 Life-cycle benefits to be considered 
a) Reduced interruption costs to Eskom, e.g. SAIDI due to planned/unplanned 
interruptions 
b) Reduced interruption costs to customers, as a function of the cost of un-served 
energy as a function of planned/unplanned interruptions) 
To quantify different smart grid’s financial costs and benefits, typical installed equipment 
costs as shown in Table 4-5 and the standard COUE rates as shown in Table 4-4 were used. 
The expected lifetime of network visibility equipment was assumed to be 15 years[82]. The 
details are further explained in the next chapters. 
Table 4-4: COUE rates used on different customer classes 
Customer classification  COUE rate (R/kWh) 
Industrial   6.69 
Mining  14.14 
Commercial  102.90 
Agricultural  20.16 
Residential  20.83 
Prepaid   5.22 
Redistributors  29.53 
Traction  111.90 
Other  27.95 
Table 4-5: Estimated costs for different equipment 
Component description Estimated costs 
RTU installation at substation R200 000 
Installation of FPI integrated with RTU  R20 000 
Installation of transformer remote monitoring per 
transformer  
R20 000 
Communications to a feeder for AMI and distribution 
smart circuits 
R170 000 
Intelligent recloser (tie point) R400 000 
Remotely controlled switches R400 000 
Distribution Automation (DA) R3 000 000 
4.11.3 Basis of Smart Grid costs  
According to [24] Smart Grids are by their nature difficult to estimate for different reasons as 
follows:  
a) The smart technology always requires integration of digital technology. Mostly 
distribution infrastructure has different failure and life cycle than the majority of 
today’s grid technologies; the rate for this equipment needs to be estimated. 
44 
 
b) It is easy to declare smart technology inoperative before the end of its life cycle due 
to defective Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Therefore; rational 
replacement costs must be estimated. 
c) Most smart grid technologies are still new and therefore there is uncertainty in its 
performance.  
d) Its marginal cost declines as it matures due to any additional costs required for new 
installations. 
Distribution’s feeder base SAIDI was calculated based on Centre of Mass theory which is 
defined as the point in a system at which the whole quantity may be considered as 




     (31) 
Where: 
𝑎1 = coefficient for sample network 
𝑎2 = coefficient for Mtonjaneni network 
𝑎3 = coefficient for Wartburg network 
𝑀1 = SAIDI for each smart grid intervention using sample network 
𝑀2 = SAIDI for each smart grid intervention using Mtonjaneni network 
𝑀3 = SAIDI for each smart grid intervention using Wartburg network 
The results indicate that increasing network visibility through smart technology application 
will always have a high positive benefit-cost ratio, and that its investment can always be 
economically justified as indicated by Figure 4-11.  
Depending on capital investment, this technology can slowly be introduced by allowing the 
operators to manually do the operating sequence until full automation is allowed. 
Operational and maintenance cost savings can also help justify capital investment. 
 



































The assumption is that all distribution substations already have an RTU installed; therefore 
RTU costs were not encompassed.  
a) At point A, is when transformer remote monitoring is installed at feeders prone to 
transformer related faults,   
b) Point B is when FPIs are installed, 
c) Point C is when advanced automated feeder switches are installed  
d) The combination of these technologies  is specified by point D as indicated by the 
benefit-cost ratio in Figure 4-11 
As smart grids mature, and the rate of new installations increases, its marginal costs are 
likely to decline rapidly as shown by Figure 4-12 [24].  
 
Figure 4-12: Costs for Grid components 
4.12 Discussion 
This chapter has highlighted the performance for KZN OU networks and how their 
performance can improve with as little as 1.6 minutes savings per kilometre on sectionalising 
and fault finding time. It was highlighted that a 10 minute saving per fault event significantly 
reduces the SAIDI value by reducing customer interruption hours and improves the overall 
system performance. The question asked earlier in this chapter about the impact of any piece 
of equipment that makes the network visible on KZN OU networks was answered. 
 It was demonstrated that the focus on the feeders with a large number of customers and long 
fault duration is critical since SAIDI is dependent on the number of customers and the fault 
duration. Analysed networks performed as expected by demonstrating the improved SAIDI 
value as the length of line increases, this also verify the theory discussed in Chapter 2 which 
states that the longer network feeders mean more components on the network which 
eventually leads to poor performance.  Again demonstrating that the long lines with high 
customers may be the focus for network visibility as compared to short lines with fewer 
components means that by installing fault path indicators on strategic positions on the 
network does reduce customer hours. Fault Path Indicators are further explained in later 
chapters where the criticality of its installation is demonstrated. 
KZN OU fault data analysis was performed and overhead networks were selected as sample 
networks due to their significant contributions to the unreliability of the network. A cost 
benefit analysis was performed and the results indicate that increasing network visibility 
 
 
   Cost                   Smart Grid 
     (R)      Component 
 
 
      
                   Traditional Grid 
   Time     Component 
   (Years) 
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through smart technology application will always have a high positive benefit-cost ratio, and 































CHAPTER 5  
TEST MODEL EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction 
The test network developed is aimed at demonstrating how the network is expected to 
perform with different smart devices placed in different locations. In Chapter 4 the 
sectionalising plus fault finding time was reduced to as little as 10 minutes per event and this 
was applied to all faults (2010 - 2014) in the KZN OU network regardless of the position of 
the device. The application of smart devices discussed in Table 2-1 is simulated. Also there 
is a need to determine that the application of the devices in the suitable test network validates 
that there will be an improvement in performance. The behaviour of this network is crucial 
before smart devices are simulated on real networks. 
5.2 Results on sample network developed 
The test network in Figure 5-1 resembles a typical 11 kV overhead radial network, the base 
network consist of disconnect switches which are important to isolate the network during 
maintenance or fault conditions.  
 
Figure 5-1: Test network model 
Since the KZN OU is fusing their MV transformers and the intent is that for transformer 

















































network. It was important to demonstrate both networks and see how they will perform. All 
the different smart grid interventions were evaluated on both a fused and an un-fused 
network.  The network in figure 5-2 was developed to represent fused transformers. 
 
Figure 5-2: Test network - fused transformers 
The components for this test network are shown in Table 5-1. Through system reliability 
modelling it has been observed that system configuration and topology, line length as well as 
the number of customers play a major role in network reliability.   

















































   
   





Fuse-1             Transformer-1 Switch 1 
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Mathematical analyses as well as PowerFactory Version 15.1 were used to verify the MV 
network reliability modelling. The failure rates and repair times as listed in Table 4-2 and 
Table 4-3 were assigned to the relevant components, as shown in Table 5-2. 
Table 5-2: Mathematical approach for SAIDI and SAIFI 
  


























































































































Line 1 50 0.15 7.5 2.00 5.0 500 500 3750 26250     
Line 2 50 0.15 7.5 2.00 5.0 500 500 3750 26250     
Line 3 20 0.15 3 2.00 5.0 500 500 1500 10500     
S1     0.66 2.00 0.5 500 500 330 825     
S2     0.66 2.00 0.5 500 100 330 693     
S3     0.66 2.00 0.5 500 100 330 693     
S4     0.66 2.00 0.5 500 300 330 759     
TRFR1     3 2.00 10.0 500 100 1500 6000     
TRFR2     3 2.00 10.0 500 100 1500 6000     
TRFR3     3 2.00 10.0 500 300 1500 12000     
                        
Total 29.64         14820 89970 29.64 179.94 
 
Table 5-2 also shows SAIDI and SAIFI values for the base network. These values are used to 
validate the impact of fused transformers and various smart devices on the network. 
It should be noted that in PowerFactory a failure rate and repair duration cannot be assigned 
to an isolator or breaker. To address this shortcoming the failure rate and repair duration 
were assigned to the terminal to which the isolator/breaker is connected. The breaker 
operating times were set to 1 minute. The time required to switch the disconnectors was set 
to 120 min, which is the expected response time of 2 hour. It should however be noted that 
this two hours include travelling time for the operator to get to site and conducting switching 
on the first disconnector, thus temporarily restoring customers that are on the unaffected part 
of the network. 
The smart technology has the ability to analyse and restore supply to a healthy part of the 
network without human intervention.  Thus improving overall system efficiency and 
minimising operational costs. 
Figure 5-3 and 5-4 show the placement of automated feeder switches in different locations 
along the feeder. Automated feeder switches improve the reliability of the network by 
reducing the outage duration, frequency of interruptions as well as reducing the impact of the 
affected customer. This is a crucial step as the position of automated feeder switches has a 
big impact on SAIDI and SAIFI measures.  
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a) At point number 1 there is the base network - no automated switch added.  
b) Point number 2 is when the automated feeder switch was placed in line 3. Line 3 is a 
lateral line that feeds 300 customers as highlighted in Figure 5-3.  
c) Point number 3 is where the automated feeder switch is placed in line 2; this lateral 
line feeds 100 customers.  
d) And point number 4 is when the automated feeder switch was placed in line 1; this 
portion of the network also feeds 100 customers.  
Customer base and length of the line need to be taken into account when placing these 
switches.  Also the number of customers that will be affected by a single breaker operation is 
significant. Line 3 is 20km long but because 300 customers will be affected it contributes 
poorly to SAIDI and SAIFI values. This is because of its position in the network; switch 1 
will have to be open for any fault that may occur on line 1. This simply means, for optimal 
performance of the network, configuration and topology is key when it comes to the 
placement of any device on the network. 
 
Figure 5-3: SAIDI - automated feeder switches 
Integration of auto reclosers with RTU reduces sectionalising time by isolating the 
downstream network through the remote switching. This is the part of the network closer to 
the load. All loads on the upstream breakers remain supplied; this is the part of the network 
closer to the source. This is recommended for all networks as it gives an indication of 
whether the fault is downstream or upstream, meaning only customers on the faulted section 
of the line are affected by a sustained interruption, the rest of the customers will be 
unaffected. The position of these devices along the network is very important as it trips and 















Figure 5-4: SAIFI - automated feeder switches 
Different positions of automated feeder switches were modelled. In this network the best 
performance is achieved at point number 3 when the automated feeder switch is placed on 
line 2 (L2). Improved results are achieved on the network with fused transformers. It was 
also noted that network length as well as number of customer connected have a big impact 
on network reliability.  
5.3 Application of Fault Path Indicators 
Fault path indicators remotely report the passage of fault current. This device is expected to 
significantly reduce the impact of number of customer affected, by quickly identifying the 
faulted section. It provides network visibility to the control center immediately when there is 
an interruption; sectionalizing and fault finding time will be minimized because the operator 
will go straight to the faulted section and back-feed the rest of the customers. Without this 
device the operator will have to perform switching to try and figure out where the fault is 
situated. For this network, two smart fault path indicators are installed on line 2 and line 3. 
 
































The results of the smart fault path indicators are demonstrated by Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6, 
which indicate both SAIDI and SAIFI for the base and fused network. As anticipated, there 
is a  significant improvement on SAIDI, a greater improvement is achieved on the fused 
network. It is expected for a fused network to perform better than un-fused due to its ability 
of isolate the faulty transformer from the rest of the network without interrupting the whole 
network. 
 
Figure 5-6: Fused network SAIDI and SAIFI- FPI 
The interruption frequency of the faulted customers did not change only the duration through 
minimising sectionalising and fault finding time. This is mainly because this device reduces 
the duration of the outage. This could be due to network configuration and the fact that there 
are very few components in this network.  
5.4 Application of transformer remote monitoring 
If there is a transformer fault on the network, then on the faulted section the patrolman has to 
drive to every single transformer to identify which transformer has faulted. The application 
of a transformer remote monitoring device on the test network has reduced sectionalising as 
well as fault finding time during transformer faults as it provide visibility for any outages 
taking place at the transformer. The fault finding time contributes significantly to outage 
duration as the operator has to drive at less than 20 km/h to perform visual inspection. In this 
instance fault finding time was eliminated as the transformer failure is visible to the RTU. 
As demonstrated in Figures 5-7 and 5-8, there is not much improvement on SAIDI with this 
device. The reason is that the rest of the faults will behave as normal. This means that this 
device will only benefit transformer faults. In order to get maximum benefit from this 
device, it is better to install it on networks that are susceptible to transformer related faults. 
Also the SAIFI remained unchanged because this device reduced fault duration, it does not 


















Figure 5-7: Base SAIDI and SAIFI - transformer remote monitoring 
 
Figure 5-8: Fused network SAIDI and SAIFI - transformer remote monitoring 
5.5 Application of Fault Location, Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR) 
This technology was looked at and it was noted that it is ideal for the network with a back 
feed capability. It provides optimal feeder re-configuration during unplanned outages. It 
detects feeder faults, determine the fault location (between 2 switches), isolates the faulted 
section of the feeder (between 2 switches) and restore service to “healthy” portions of the 
feeder. It also provides the facility of restoring some customers before patrolmen arrive to 
site. The network may require additional tie points to accomplish FLISR. This technology 
was not modelled in this case as it is best, suited for networks with an alternative source, it is  
































5.6 Combination FPI and automated feeder switch 
As highlighted earlier, the automated feeder switch performed well when placed in line 2. 
Futher demonstration was done where distribution automation was simulated through the 
application of both automated feeder switch and smart fault path indicator on the test 
network.  
The automated feeder switch is installed in L2, and the FPI is installed in L1 and L2.  
Figures 5-9 and 5-10 illustrate Distribution Automation(DA), where two or more devices are 
installed in one network. There is a significant improvement on both SAIDI and SAIFI. As 
expected, optimum results are achieved when the smart technology is applied on the network 
with fused transformers. 
It should be noted that results are network specific and only one automatic feeder switch is 
installed in this instance. Different results may be obtained for different network 
configurations. However to achieve maximum benefits of the smart technology, it is 
recommended to first analyse some key factors including network topology, configuration, 
equipment type, environment,  number of customers and the customer type that will be 
interrupted per single breaker operation as well as the history of faults on the network.  
It is also important to highlight that even if the second automated feeder switch is added on 
this network it does not make any difference in terms of improving the reliability of the 
network any further.  Therefore this means that the amount of smart devices added in the 
network is irrelevant in terms of reliability improvement; however the application of smart 
devices in the strategic positions along the network is key. 
 


















Figure 5-10: Fuse network SAIDI and SAIFI Distribution Automation 
5.7 Discussion  
Different smart technology intervention has been simulated in the test network. The results 
have proven that smart technology provides greater network visibility to disturbances over 
traditional approaches. This means that when a breaker trips network control is immediately 
aware of the interruption as opposed to only being made aware when a customer calls in to 
the contact centre. The results are summarise in Table 5-3. It has also highlighted the 
importance of the location of the device along the network. 
   Table 5-3: Results for different smart devices 
Smart 
device 
SAIDI (hour/yr) SAIFI(times/yr) 

















180 128 167 122 27 20 23 17 
Fault Path 
Indicator 




180 165 167 152 27 27 23 23 
Distribution 
Automation 
180 100 167 95 27 20 23 17 
 
a) Installation of FPIs has yielded SAIDI improvement through minimizing fault 
location  time. It was expected that the SAIFI of the network will not change due to 
















affected, but improves the sectionalising and fault finding time. There is a 30% 
improvement of the SAIDI 
b) Automated feeder switches have improved both the SAIDI and the SAIFI of the 
network through automatic isolation of the faulty part of the network before the 
operator gets to site.  Application of this technology has  reduced fault finding as 
well as maintenance costs. It also minimises the number of customers exposed to a 
fault within seconds as opposed to waiting for an operator to get to site. There was a 
32% improvement on the SAIDI and a 37% improvement on the SAIFI 
c) Transformer remote monitoring has also reduced the sectionalising and fault finding 
times for transformer related faults. For optimal performance of this device , it needs 
to be installed in networks that are prone to transformer related faults. It provides 
visibility in such a way that by the time the operator get notified of a fault , they will 
also be made aware if it is a transformer failure, so they will have to carry a spare 
transformer to site to avoid delays. There was only a 15%  improvement on the 
SAIDI  using this device. 
d) Distribution automation highlights the fact that two or more smart technologies can 
be installed in one network to achieve optimal performance; however, certain factors 
such as customer base and network configuration need to be looked at very closely. 
Each technology needs to be justifiable, as demonstrated in the test network just one 
automated feeder switch and two FPIs were enough for optimal performanceAdding 
more on this network was not improving the performance of the network any further. 
Both the SAIDI and the SAIFI were improved by this technology by 44% and 37% 
respectively. 
 
Importantly, the migration to a smart grid can be done gradually, where devices can be 
installed in stages depending on the needs of the utility. Whether the focus is SAIDI or 
SAIFI or both. It was also established that FLISR technology is suitable for interconnected 


















CHAPTER 6  
KZN OU NETWORKS EVALUATION AND RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
Smart devices are applied on selected networks in the KZN OU. The aim is to demonstrate 
the benefits of smart technology on real networks. Significant benefits of smart devices were 
realised in the test network discussed in Chapter 5. Since the test network is a simple radial 
feeder, not all smart devices were tested so the intent now is to test all smart devices 
discussed in Chapter 2. Selected sample networks with different characteristics were 
simulated to validate the results. 
6.2 Sample networks  
The sample networks used are selected from Pietermaritzburg and Empangeni zones. This is 
because both these are exposed to different environmental conditions and their 
characteristics are quite different. 
Table 6-1: Component exposure 
Networks #Transformers #Switches #Overhead 
lines 
#Customers 
Wartburg NB 22 
11kV 
62 94 50km 151 
Wartburg NB 23 
11kV 
88 120 57km 266 
Mtonjaneni NB1 
22kV 
193 259 175km 925 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Geographic view of Mtonjaneni NB1 




The number of equipment for these networks is indicated by Table 6-1. Wartburg NB 22 and 
23 11kV overhead lines can be 100% backed from each and Mtonjaneni NB1 11kV 
overhead line is a long rural network. Each network consists of different components which 
can fail and result in an outage on a feeder.    
 
The approach taken for the reliability calculation of MV networks recognizes that, from first 
principles, certain components like length of line, number of transformers, location of fuses 
and breakers etc. have a significant impact on the reliability of a feeder. The operational 
environments in which the different types of equipment operate also influence their 
performance. Therefore the expected level of performance (SAIDI) of these networks will be 
sensitive to network topology, customer numbers, operating environment etc. As noted in 
Figure 6-1, Mtonjaneni NB1 has a high number of equipment and a high number of 
customers and is therefore expected to be less reliable when compared to Wartburg NB 22 
and NB23 shown in Figure 6-2. 
 
Figure 6-2: Geographic view of Wartburg NB22 & NB23 
6.3 Mtonjaneni NB1 22kV and Wartburg NB22 and NB23 11kV network 
results 
The failure rates and repair times as listed in Table 4-2 and Table 4-3 were applied on these 
networks and assigned to each component. 
Mtonjaneni NB1 22kV network is separated into 5 protection zones, which is the section of 
the line bounded by an upstream breaker or a recloser that will trip for a downstream fault 
that is S366, S330, S320, S329 and S325 as indicated by Figure 6-3. These breakers are 
visible to the control centre through a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) and this makes it easier 
to sectionalise and fault find without interrupting the rest of the network. It should be noted 
that SAIDI and SAIFI calculations are based on all possible faults thrown in different parts 
of the system. 
S 





Figure 6-3:  Mtonjaneni network single line diagram 
Figure 6-3 also indicates the high level single line diagram for the Mtonjaneni NB1 22kV 
network. This is a very long network therefore not all switching points are represented by 
this diagram, only the critical points to reflect how the customers are connected from each 
load point are indicated. 
6.4 Applications of automated feeder switches  
The behaviour of the switches in the network model is crucial in reliability analysis. 
Basically automated feeder switches are circuit breakers controlled by relays or with 
communications from a control room. Analysis of key factors including network topology 
and characteristics is vital. Integration of auto reclosers with RTU reduces sectionalising 
time by isolating the downstream network through the remote switching. All loads on 
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upstream breakers remain supplied. The estimated time for the operator to get to the first 
disconnector and operate with the purpose of isolating the faulty section is 2 hours.   
 
Figure 6-4: Operation of automated switches 
Figure 6-4 indicates two radial distribution networks with three manually operated switches 
for network isolation and load transfer. The relay 1 will trip for any permanent fault 
experienced on Line 1 resulting in supply interruption on all loads on both lines 1 and 2. To 
restore load in the unaffected section of the network, in this case line 2, operators need to be 
dispatched and go to site to manually open switch 2 and then close switch 5. The assumption 
is that it takes an operator 2 hours to operate the first switch thus partially restoring load to 
the network which is fed by line 2. The network will be returned to its normal state once the 
fault in line 1 has been repaired.  
With the automated feeder switches, the time to restore network to the unaffected section of 
the network will be reduced to 1 minute, this actuation time is taken from the global ’remote 
controlled’ switch actuation time [77].  
Figure 6-5 indicates the same network where manual switches are replaced with 
automatically controlled fault interrupting switches (i.e., electronic reclosers, breakers, etc.). 
In addition, the protection provided for all of the breakers and automatic switches is 
connected together via a communications link. 
 
Figure 6-5: Operation of automated tie switch 
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Communications link provide significant improvements for the automation and control 
possibilities. As indicated in Figure 6-5, each protective relay communicates with the 
adjacent relays that have control functions. This methodology allows fast automatic 
restoration of load to line 2 and avoids dispatching an operator to restore load manually. It 
also saves approximately one hour fifty minutes in restoring service to the Line 2 load. 
In long networks like Mtonjaneni NB1 22kV network the position of these switches along 
the network is very important for remote monitoring and control, as it trips and isolates the 
downstream network during fault conditions this is the section of the line closer to the 
affected load. Different positions were modelled and verified that optimum performance is 
achieved when it is placed at S330 as shown in figure 6-6.  
 
Figure 6-6: SAIDI and SAIFI for Mtonjaneni network - automated switches 
Because the Mtonjaneni network does not have back feed capabilities, Wartburg network 
was modelled to see how the tie point switch (N/O) reacts during fault conditions. S66, S39 
and S356 are tie point switches that can provide back feed capabilities to both the Wartburg 
NB22 and 23 networks as indicated by single line diagram in Figures 6-7 and 6-8.  
 









Base AFS366 AFS330 AFS320 AFS325 AFS329
Position of automated feeder switches
SAIDI
SAIFI
                S66    S25PFBN24     S29                            N/0 
NB22           S215   S18           S59               S24     S303    SB39  S305 
 
        S17                 
S669 
 
       S306                 
S670 
   
        S38    S758             
S671 
      N/O 
       S760  S757    BM39         S759            
S672 
 




These control system were modelled in such a way that they transfer loads automatically to 
balance load between feeders after an outage.   
Figure 6-8: Wartburg NB23 single line diagram 
During fault conditions it is not always practical for an operator to perform all the essential 
instructions and checks to analyse loading conditions before transferring load to an alternate 
source. Each instruction may require several operations to be performed in a specific 
sequence including switching, tap position changes, capacitor banks, and protection 
optimization. In addition system and safety checks must be performed to ensure equipment 
ratings are not exceeded and personnel safety is not compromised[84].  
Fault Location Isolation and Service Restoration (FLISR) technology automates these tasks 
to allow utilities to take advantage of the opportunity for increased reliability in complex 
distribution networks. It has capability of locating a fault and automatically restores supply 
to the upstream side of the faulted section. This function is fully co-ordinated, it can be 
centralised or decentralised, as discussed in Chapter 2. Ideally an organisation should 
introduce this technology step by step, starting from being manually operated by the 
operators to fully integrating it with a Distribution Management System (DMS) for full 
automation. DMS has the global overview of the entire distribution network.  
Automated feeder switches were also simulated in different locations along the Wartburg NB 
22 and 23 11 kV overhead lines, which can be back- fed from each as shown in Figure 6-9.  
PFB NB22   
     566   S356 
NB23                529  S63  S68  S69 
      S510              S67             S229 
 
               S57  S79 S230 
               S58 S48  
               S61 S49 





Figure 6-9: SAIDI and SAIFI Wartburg Automated Feeder Switches 
As noted the automated feeder switches were installed at S669 and S68, thereafter the 
combination of these switches were simulated. The best performance is achieved when both 
these switches are installed. The improvement on the SAIDI and the SAIFI is 41% and 38% 
respectively. These devices play a huge role in terms of improving the frequency of the 
affected customers, because it provides fast automatic restoration to the unaffected 
customers without human intervention.  
6.5 FPI in Wartburg and Mtonjaneni networks 
During system modelling, it was evident that the smart technology has the ability to analyse 
and restore supply to a healthy part of the network without human intervention. Thus 
minimising operational costs and improving overall system efficiency. 
In case of any disturbance, the protection equipment indicates the fault location through the 
SCADA. The starting point for fault finding is the open disconnector. An average protection 
zone has about 15 switching points.  With the fault path indicator these switching points are 
reduced to about 2 to 3 operations. This translates to about 90 minutes savings on 
sectionalising and fault finding.   
According to[81], the simulation work done by the author indicates at least 20 minutes 
improvement on sectionalising time on the network with fault path indicators hence 
improving overall system performance. 
The benefit of the Fault path indicators (FPI) are realized when installed on the long 
networks with high number of customers rather than network with fewer customers. Three 
FPI’s were installed at the Mtonjaneni NB1 22kV network on S75 in zone 1, S33 which is in 
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Figure 6-10: SAIDI and SAIFI Mtonjaneni network – FPI 
Two FPIs were installed in the Wartburg NB 22 and 23 11 kV network, at S69 and S29 as 
demonstrated by Figure 6-11. There is 46% and 21% improvement on the SAIDI and the 
SAIFI respectively in the Mtonjaneni network. On the Wartburg network, there is a 46 % 
improvement in the SAIDI and a 7% improvement in the SAIFI. Changes in the SAIFI value 
are also insignificant especially in the Wartburg network. These results prove that each 
network is different. Network topology, equipment exposure as well as number of customers 
play a vital role. This also highlights the fact that for long networks, the interruption 
frequency of the interrupted customers does reduce because the opening and closing of 
breakers is minimised through reduction of the sectionalising and the fault finding time. 
 




























6.6 Transformer remote monitoring on the Mtonjaneni and Wartburg 
networks 
During unplanned outages or interruptions when the network breaker trips, most of the time 
is being spent patrolling the lines and fault finding. The patrolman will first start by 
sectionalizing to isolate the faulted section from the rest of the network and back feeding 
some customers. If it is a transformer fault, then on the faulted section the patrolman has to 
drive to every single transformer to identify which one has faulted. The huge benefit of 
transformer remote monitoring is that is there is a transformer fault, it will be visible to the 
control centre so the operator will be dispatched to go and repair a faulted transformer right 
away, instead of doing sectionalising and fault finding prior the repairs. 
 
Figure 6-12: Transformer remote monitoring Mtonjaneni SAIDI and SAIFI 
 




























When doing SAIDI and SAIFI calculations for a network, all possible faults and scenarios 
are placed in each component at a time. Transformer remote monitoring will only benefit 
transformer faults; all other faults duration will remain unchanged. Ideally this device will 
benefit those networks that are prone to transformer failures. This device was modelled on 
the Mtonjaneni and Wartburg network as shown in Figures 6-12 and 6-13.  
At the Mtonjaneni network there is a 21% reduction for both the SAIDI and the SAIFI. This 
improvement is not so significant as compared to automated feeder switches. The reason is 
that it only improved transformer related faults whereas the SAIDI and the SAIFI 
calculations are based on all possible faults on the system. For the Wartburg network there is 
32% change in the SAIDI and no change in the SAIFI. 
6.7 Combination of devices 
As earlier discussed, the best performance at the Mtonjaneni network is achieved when FPIs 
are installed at S7, S33 and S3222. The combination of these FPIs and the automated feeder 
switch is demonstrated by Figure 6-14. It should be noted that 2 automated feeder switches 
are installed at S330 and S329. The response time for automated feeder switch is 1 minute, 
by the time the operator get to site the faulted section of the line is already isolated. 
 
Figure 6-14: Distribution Automation for the Mtonjaneni network 
6.8 Application of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) outage detection 
Smart fault path indicators notify the control centre when faults occur, so do outage 
notification systems through smart meters. The difference between these two outage 
notification systems is that over and above outage notification, there are more other added 
benefits that come with AMI technologies. For the traditional system, a utility will get 
notified of a fault through the customer calling in. 
AMI technology involves not only metering functionality but also communications 
infrastructure, software applications, and data exchange interfaces between the electric 
utility, the meter, the consumer. This technology is used to alert the organisation of any 
interruption and its location in the distribution network. Therefore sectionalising and fault 















Once the power to the meter is lost, smart meters are designed with outage notification 
functionalities that allow the meter to transmit a “last gasp” alert to the system. The alert has 
the meter number information, the time of interruption and its location.  This information is 
processed through the AMI and sends a notification to the control centre about the event. 
Once the fault is repaired the “power on” alert is sent to the control centre through the AMI 
from the smart meter. Effective resource management is undertaken to ensure service 
restoration on all sites before operators leave site.  
6.9 Discussion 
Significant benefits are realized with the application of smart devices in real networks. The 
Wartburg network has back-feed capabilities, so the normal open (N/O) switches were 
modeled in such a way that when the fault occurs, they are able to sense the fault and 
automatically close to temporary back-feed the customers in a healthy part of the network. 
After implementing the advanced automated switches, FLSIR technology SAIDI 
improvement is 60% as compared to the base, and 38% improvement on SAIFI as shown by 
Table 6-2. For the Mtonjaneni network there is a 48% and 40% improvement on both the 
SAIDI and the SAIFI respectively. 
More benefits of the FPI are realized when installed on the long networks with high number 
of customers rather than networks with fewer customers. Based on the Mtonjaneni NB1 22 
kV and Wartburg NB22 and NB23 11 kV network results, for any single event there is 10 
minutes savings on sectionalising time per 60 km of line which equates to a 1.67 min per km 
per fault saving. There is a 46% and 21% improvement on the SAIDI and the SAIFI 
respectively in the Mtonjaneni network. On the Wartburg network there is a 46% 
improvement on the SAIDI and no improvement on the SAIFI as demonstrated by Table 6-3.  
Table 6-2: Results summary for the Mtonjaneni network 









SAIDI base 63 63 63 63 
SAIDI smart 33 34 50 27 
SAIFI base 28 28 28 28 
SAIFI smart 17 22 22 17 
It was expected for these networks to perform differently because their characteristics are 
quite different. This simple means that you cannot take one network’s results and implement 
for all. Each network is to be treated on its own merits.  
Transformer remote monitoring is only justifiable for feeders that are prone to transformer 
related faults. This device is only effective if something goes wrong in the transformer, for 
any other faults it will not operate. At the Mtonjaneni network there is a 21% improvement 
on both the SAIDI and the SAIFI. This improvement is not so significant as compared to 
other devices; the reason is that it only improved transformer related faults whereas SAIDI 
and SAIFI calculations are based on all possible faults on the system. For the Wartburg 




Table 6-3: Results summary for the Wartburg network 
Wartburg NB 22 and 23 11kV overhead line 







SAIDI base 37 37 37 
SAIDI smart 10 20 25 
SAIFI base 16 16 16 
SAIFI smart 15 15 16 
It was also confirmed in this chapter that smart fault path indicators notify the control centre 
when faults occur, so does the outage notification system through smart meters; therefore the 
simulation results for both these devices are the same. For the Wartburg network there is a 
46% improvement for the SAIDI and a 7% improvement for the SAIFI. There is a 46% and 
21% improvement on the SAIDI and the SAIFI respectively in the Mtonjaneni network. 
Technology that yields significant improvement on SAIDI and SAIFI and also operational 
costs savings is the technology that reduces the interruption frequency of customers while 
reducing overall outage duration. This is demonstrated when achieving the best performance 
through Distribution Automation for the Mtonjaneni network is when SAIDI is 57% and 
SAIFI of 40%. For the Wartburg network the improvement is 60% for the SAIDI and 38% 











CHAPTER 7  
CONCLUSION 
7.1 Conclusion 
This research was aimed at evaluating the application of smart technologies with the intent 
of improving the reliability of Eskom’s medium voltage (MV) networks. This included the 
use of smart technology for the reduction of unplanned outage duration, reduction of 
frequency of unplanned outages and the reduction of maintenance and operational 
expenditure associated with outage management while improving overall system 
performance. This confirms that smart technology applied in a correct manner can improve 
reliability in terms of reliability indices such as SAIDI, SAIFI, etc. of power distribution 
systems by making use of digital and advanced technologies, thus the hypothesis was proved 
positively. 
Various smart grid technologies applicable for this function were identified. Smart fuse 
saver, smart fault path indicator, automated switches, transformer remote monitoring, Fault 
Location Isolation & Service Restoration (FLISR) and AMI and Smart meter for outage 
detection were recognized as the key smart grid technologies applicable for distribution 
system reliability improvements. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the capabilities for the 
identified smart grid technologies, it was necessary to conduct reliability analysis and 
evaluations on a test network as well as real networks from KZN OU. It is also important to 
note that failure in the system is inevitable however the impact of failure can be minimized 
through the application of smart grid technologies. 
It has been observed that results are network specific, different results may be obtained for 
different network configurations. Hence the performances of the studied Smart Grid cases 
varied in the simulated networks. This was mainly due to the following reasons: 
a) The network with a high number of equipment will have a poor performance as 
compared to a network with less equipment because SAIDI calculation is based on 
every possible fault thrown on every piece of equipment. The test network had less 
equipment as compared to the other networks. 
 
b) The length of the line plays a significant role in reliability analysis; this is expected 
as any fault on a longer line with more customers would result in more customer 
hours and a greater SAIDI value and  hence the line’s failure rate are calculated 
based on the kilometre. 
 
c) What is more significant is the customer distribution in a network. The number of 
customers that are affected by a single breaker operation has a major impact on the 
overall network reliability. As SAIDI is dependent on the number of customers and 
the fault duration, it becomes critically important to focus on the lines with high 
customers and long fault duration. This need to be taken into account during the 
planning stage when connecting new customers.  
As the smart grid matures and the rate of new installations increases, its marginal costs are 
likely to decline rapidly. In conclusion, smart grid investment can always be economically 




The identified smart grid technologies were applied in the test network as well as the 
selected networks from KZN OU to validate the results and these were the following 
outcomes and recommendations: 
a) For greater network visibility, reliability can be improved by implementation of 
automated feeder switches as well as automated feeder switches with advance 
features (FLISR technologies). It is recommended to apply this technology in the 
worse performing feeders.  Analysis performed in this study has confirmed that 
networks with automated feeder switching were able to reduce the frequency of 
outages, the number of customers affected by both sustained outages and momentary 
interruptions, and the total number of outages. In short, these changes are in line 
with the objectives of this study which is the improvement of SAIDI and SAIFI. 
 
b) From the previous fault data analysis it was noted that only 9% of faults in the KZN 
OU are caused by transformers. Therefore, transformer remote monitoring was also 
evaluated as a possible solution to improve reliability of the power distribution 
system during transformer failures. The results confirmed that this solution can be 
applied to networks that are prone to transformer related faults as they reduce fault 
finding time. 
 
c) FPIs are the most beneficial approach to reducing the overall outage duration, and 
are the cost effective approaches for reducing fault finding time by at least 50% or 
more. FPI’s are an immediate recommended solution as a starting point for 
distribution’ s feeder base as a cost effective solution that will yield huge benefits 
within 1-2 years in terms of SAIDI improvement.  Outage management through 
AMI technologies is also recommended depending on capital investment however 
the added benefits that come with this technology should help justify the project. 
Applying this basic time saving model to recorded faults across the KZN OU 
network illustrates that there is a significant improvement in SAIDI.  
 
d) The smart fuse saver was also evaluated. This device opens and clears a fault in as 
little as a half-cycle before the fuse operates for a transient fault as the fuse is unable 
to distinguish between temporary and permanent faults, and it blows on all faults. It 
can also be easily integrated with the RTU to provide visibility for any operations 
taking place on the fuse.   KZN OU is currently fusing the transformers only, by 
application of expulsion type fuses on medium voltage overhead line networks. The 
intention is that when a transformer fails, ideally the fuse should operate isolating 
the faulty transformer from the rest of the network. The installation of the smart fuse 
saver in series with the fuse in this instance was evaluated. The benefits for this 
device are achievable when the fuse is applied as a spur line protective device. This 
device is therefore not a recommended solution as Eskom KZN OU is only fusing 
the transformers and not using fuse as a spur line protection. 
However to maximise the benefits of the smart technology, it is recommended to first 
analyse some key factors including network topology, configuration, customer type, number 
of customers per single breaker operation and history of faults of the network. A reliable 
communication link is needed for the effectiveness of a smart technology. 
Having investigated three sample feeders on DigSilent to illustrate the application of smart 
technology, an investigation across the whole KZN OU, based on the savings acquired, was 
undertaken, as detailed in Chapter 4. Applying this time saving model to recorded faults 
across the KZN OU network illustrated that there is a significant improvement in the SAIDI. 
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Based on these results, the application of this technology to the entire Distribution’s feeder 
base will continually have a positive benefit on the SAIDI. The benefit-cost ratio analysis for 
Distribution’s feeder base was conducted using cost estimates in Chapter 4 and the results 
indicate that increasing network visibility through smart technology application will always 
have a high positive benefit-cost ratio, and that its investment can always be economically 
justified. 
7.3 Further Research 
As mentioned earlier in this report, the smart grid is a conventional power system that uses 
digital technologies via two way communications to improve reliability, security and 
efficiency of power systems from generation through transmission and distribution system to 
the consumers and provides greater visibility to disturbances over traditional approaches. 
The content of this study touched parts of these areas. Future work could include the 
following:  
a) Continue research to interface Distributed Generations system 
 
b) Improve reliability by energy savings scheme through the use of volt/VAR 




















SAIDI code calculations 













[r,c] = size(net_txt); 
%net_r = round(r*rand(1)); 
  
% I could iterate here to look at all networks above distance x 
  
% Need to implement loop here and remove the data that we don't want 
to see 
% For example we want to look at lines longer than 10 km, if there 
are no 




display('Iterating through Network Data'); 
  
for net_r = 2:r 
  
net_name = char(net_txt(net_r,6)); 
net_cst = net_num(net_r-1,19); 
net_l = net_num(net_r-1,13); 
% Analyse and remove the networks that are irrelevant 
  
% No customers / or lines 
net_cst(isnan(net_cst))=0; 
net_l(isnan(net_l))=0; 
net_l(net_l>400)=0  ; 
  
% Min customers 
if net_cst < min_cust; 
    continue 
end 
  
% Min length 
if net_l < min_l 
    continue 
end 
  
% Record information in new array 
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ttl_net = ttl_net+1; 
ttl_name(ttl_net) = {net_name}; 
ttl_l(ttl_net) = net_l; 
ttl_cst(ttl_net) = net_cst; 
  
display('Capturing Fault Data'); 
flt_name = fault_txt(:,5); 
flt_idx = strfind(flt_name,net_name); 
flt_r = find(~cellfun(@isempty,flt_idx)); 
  
% We need to analyse the data here and remove the irrelevant data, 
such as 
% minimum 5 customers affected? 
  
flt_hrs = fault_num(flt_r-1,9); 
flt_hrs(flt_hrs<1)= 0; 
flt_cst = fault_num(flt_r-1,11); 
  




SAIDI_b(ttl_net) = sum(flt_hrs)./net_cst; 
%SAIDI(ttl_net) = sum(flt_hrs)/net_cst; 
  
display('Calculating Saving in SAIDI'); 
  
% Save t minutes per fault or t minutes per 10 km per fault 
flt_s = (flt_hrs./flt_cst-t/60).*flt_cst; 
flt_s(flt_s<1)= 0; 
  
SAIDI_s(ttl_net) = sum(flt_s)/net_cst; 
  
% Save t minutes per fault or t minutes per 10 km per fault 
flt_a = (flt_hrs./flt_cst-tkm/60*net_l/10).*flt_cst; 
flt_a(flt_a<1)= 0; 
  
SAIDI_a(ttl_net) = sum(flt_a)/net_cst; 
  
% Save 2t minutes per fault or t minutes per 10 km per fault 
flt_a2 = (flt_hrs./flt_cst-2*tkm/60*net_l/10).*flt_cst; 
flt_a2(flt_a2<1)= 0; 
  










SAIDI time saving code 
function [len,ttl_l,average,average_s,average_a,average_a2] = 
saidi() 
  
for l = 1:80 
     




average_b(l) = sum(SAIDI_b)/length(SAIDI_b); 
average_s(l) = sum(SAIDI_s)/length(SAIDI_s); 
average_a(l) = sum(SAIDI_a)/length(SAIDI_a); 
average_a2(l) = sum(SAIDI_a2)/length(SAIDI_a2); 
  
l_cst(l)=sum(ttl_l./ttl_cst) 







len = 1:80; 
  
figure,plot(len,average_b,len,average_s,len,average_a),xlabel('Lengt
h (km)'),ylabel('SAIDI'),legend('Base Case','10 Minute Saving per 
Fault','1.67 Minutes Saving per km per Fault') 
figure,plot(len,average_b,len,average_s,len,average_a,len,average_a2
),xlabel('Length (km)'),ylabel('SAIDI'),legend('Base Case','10 
Minute Saving per Fault','1.67 Minutes Saving per km per 








'Length (km)'),ylabel('SAIDI'),legend('Base Case','10 Minute Saving 
per Fault','2 Minutes Saving per km per Fault') 
%  






% figure,histogram(ttl_l,10),xlabel('Length (km)'),ylabel('Number of 
Lines') 
%  
% [x,y] = histcounts(ttl_l,10) 




% for k = 1:length(y)-1 





% % k = length(y) 
% % Z = ttl_cst; 
% % Z(Z<y(k))=0; 
% % z(k)=sum(Z); 
%  
% figure,bar(y(1:length(y)-1),z),xlabel('Length 
(km)'),ylabel('Number of Customers') 
% figure,scatter(y(2:length(y)),x,z,z,'fill'),xlabel('Length 
(km)'),ylabel('Number of Lines') 
% figure,scatter3(y(2:length(y)),x,z,z,z,'filled'),xlabel('Length 







Powerfactory – Simulations 
 




C2. SAIDI results for FPI 
 




C4. Base network SAIDI 
 




C6. Mtonjaneni Transformer remote monitoring - SAIDI 
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